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The end of the Cold War melted the bipolar world that arranged most 
every international policy in terms of West and East.  Once freed from 
this aspic, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) emerged on the world 
stage with new power and stature to shape agendas in international 
development.  These changes have altered the face of international 
development assistance and presented new challenges for the design of 
new international development institutions and the continued relevance 
of the old. 
This Article takes up those challenges and, in doing so, fills a gap in 
two distinct but related bodies of scholarship.  The post-Cold War 
growth of NGOs and their proper role in public international affairs has 
been the subject of a robust literature in legal scholarship.1  The impact 
of globalization on international development is also extensively 
discussed in scholarship on development economics and global justice.2  
                                                          
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University.  This Article has 
benefited greatly from the inputs of participants in the symposium Governing Civil Society: NGO 
Accountability, Legitimacy and Influence held at Brooklyn Law School in October 2010 and from 
the University of Richmond School of Law faculty, to whom I presented an early draft.  Thanks are 
also due to Peter Spiro, Amy Sinden, Richard Greenstein, and Katherine Jones for very helpful 
insights on early drafts, and to David Fagelson for much useful guidance.  I am also grateful for the 
excellent research assistance of Noa Kaumeheiwa, Timothy O’Carroll, Benjamin Vaughan, Kalina 
Lovell, Peter Veloski, Jane Osterlind, Amy Drapkin, and Erica Dressler. 
 1.  See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, in 
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 26 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005); Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of 
Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 891 (2011); Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for 
NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161 (2002); Kal Raustiala, Note, The “Participatory Revolution” in 
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997).   
 2.  See, e.g., JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 
(2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003); Deen K. Chatterjee, 
Introduction to THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY 1 (Deen K. 
Chatterjee ed., 2004); Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, in THE ETHICS OF 
ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY, supra, at 260.  For the purposes of this Article, I 
take “globalization” to connote an increased interdependence and interaction among countries and 
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I examine how these phenomena combine to affect international 
development institutions. 
The challenges for the design of international development 
institutions that arise because of NGOs’ expanded power concern what 
priorities get to control.  Since the end of the Cold War, the priorities of 
cause NGOs such as WorldVision, Oxfam, Save the Children, and many 
others with expertise in development have replaced the Cold War 
priorities of donor countries as the driving force in setting development 
aid agendas.3  These NGOs have a deep and abiding interest in the 
humanitarian needs of developing country citizens.  As their priorities 
become donor country priorities, the priorities of the development 
institutions that donor countries create change also.4  So too, do the kinds 
of information and inputs those institutions need to fulfill the tasks 
expected of them.  In particular, information about the needs, views, and 
lives of ordinary citizens becomes key.  This is the kind of information 
and expertise NGOs are seen as uniquely qualified to provide given their 
extensive experience in the field.5 
NGOs, claiming to have this expertise, have fought hard in recent 
years for the right to participate in the governance of international 
development institutions.6  Their efforts have met with considerable 
success.  For example, many NGOs now participate, along with 
                                                                                                                       
their citizens—both as between developed and developing countries, and between developed 
countries inter se—that began with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise in opportunities 
for greater transnational activity.  See Tim Dunne, The Spectre of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 17, 20–21 (1999) (discussing a widely-used definition of globalization incorporating 
“the intensification of worldwide social relations” (quoting Anthony Giddens, quoted in Jan Hart 
Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 14, 15 
(John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 3.  See, e.g., David Lewis, Development NGOs and the Challenge of Partnership: Changing 
Relations Between North and South, 32 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 501, 502–03 (1998) (discussing 
NGOs’ increased prominence and the changes in development policy beginning in the 1990s). 
 4.  See Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance of the World Bank, in 
REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK 54, 63 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002) 
(noting how donor countries influence the World Bank and how donor countries themselves are 
influenced by lobbying NGOs). 
 5.  See Debora Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance 
in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 172 (2002) (noting that NGOs are 
“major conduits for development aid” and in some countries perform services ordinarily handled by 
local government). 
 6.  For the purposes of this Article, I adopt Barbara Koremenos’s, Charles Lipson’s, and 
Duncan Snidal’s definition of international institution: “[an] explicit arrangement[], negotiated 
among international actors, that prescribe[s], proscribe[s], and/or authorize[s] behavior.”  Barbara 
Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, in 
THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 2 (Barbara Koremenos et al. eds., 
2003). 
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governments, in the governance of the newest international development 
institutions, such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (Global Fund)7 and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).8  
Participating NGOs range from well-known large international 
organizations like the World Wildlife Fund to local organizations such as 
southern Africa’s ZERO Regional Environment Organization.9  Having 
broken a traditional barrier between private and governmental 
organizations, NGOs now maintain that their participation in institutional 
governance is critical to any development institution’s legitimacy. 
Recently, for example, commentators have argued that NGO 
participation in governance is a condition of the newly minted Green 
Climate Fund’s legitimacy.10  In response to similar arguments, the 
Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (now the Global Partnership for 
Education) fund, a global fund for primary school education in 
developing countries, recently restructured to allow NGOs to participate 
in governance.11  Prominent policymakers have also suggested that NGO 
participation in governance is necessary for the legitimacy of other 
international development institutions.  For example, former World 
Bank12 President Jim Wolfensohn pushed the Bank to be more inclusive 
                                                          
 7.  See CHERYL TOKSOZ, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, 
PARTNERING FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: THE GLOBAL FUND AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 28 (2010), 
available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/donors/private/ (follow “Partnering for Global 
Health with the Private Sector (PDF-2MB)” hyperlink) (listing private sector board members and 
contributors). 
 8.  See Global Env’t Facility [GEF], Enhancing the Engagement of Civil Society 
Organizations in the Operations of the GEF, at iii, GEF/C.39/10/Rev.1 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/GEF_C.39_10_Rev.1_Enhancing_the_Engagement_of_CSO (noting that 
NGOs have historically participated in governance of the GEF). 
 9.  See, e.g., Members, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www.gefngo.org/formmaster.cfm?& 
action=main&menuid=12 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
 10.  See, e.g., KATHERINE SIERRA, BROOKINGS INST., THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND’S PRIVATE 
SECTOR FACILITY: THE CASE FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION ON THE BOARD 3 (2012), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/08/green-climate-private-sector-sierra 
(summarizing arguments for private sector participation on the board of the Green Climate Fund). 
 11.  See THE EDUC. FOR ALL-FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.globalpartnership.org/library/publications/. 
 12.  As used herein, the term “World Bank” or “Bank” refers collectively to two distinct legal 
entities within the World Bank Group: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).  IBRD uses the proceeds of its bond 
issues to issue loans to developing countries.  INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., 
INFORMATION STATEMENT 26 (Sept. 9, 2012), http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/Information 
Statement.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK, INFORMATION STATEMENT].  IDA is funded mainly by 
contributions from member countries, which are replenished every three years.  IDA Replenishments, 
WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida-replenishments.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).  
IDA issues low-interest or interest-free loans and some grants to developing countries.  What is 
IDA?, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
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of NGOs.13  Another former Bank president, Robert Zoellick, has also 
noted that organizations like the Bank should connect “more and more 
countries, companies, individuals, and NGOs” to be an effective and 
legitimate institution.14  In a similar vein, then-Secretary-General of the 
United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, declared in 2001 that increased 
engagement of civil society organizations in the UN’s proposed “Global 
Fund” to fight infectious disease would be integral to its success.15 
If these claims are valid, and NGO participation in governance is 
indeed critical to the legitimacy of an international development 
institution,16 the implications are far-reaching.  It would mean that the 
design of all new state-sponsored development initiatives should include 
NGO participation in their governance structures.  It would also prompt 
reevaluation of the legitimacy of existing development institutions, such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), from whose governance NGOs are presently excluded.  This 
Article examines these implications in three stages.  First, it analyzes 
what proponents of NGO participation in governance appear to mean 
when they claim that NGO participation is critical to institutional 
legitimacy.  Second, it explores the underlying values and goals at stake.  
Lastly, it reviews what evidence we have that the claim can be supported. 
The first stage shows that legitimacy is the wrong frame within 
which to evaluate what NGO participation in governance contributes to 
                                                          
 13.  Sebastian Mallaby, Columnist, Wash. Post, Debate Sponsored by the Robert F. Kennedy 
Center for Human Rights: Protagonists or Antagonists?  The Role of NGOs and the World Bank in 
the Fight Against Poverty (Nov. 18, 2004), available at rfkcenter.org/protagonists-or-antagonists-
the-role-of-ngos-and-the-world-bank-in-the-fight-against-poverty. 
 14.  See Robert B. Zoellick, The End of the Third World? Modernizing Multilateralism for a 
Multipolar World, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 371, 381 (2010) (“Modern multilateralism will not be a 
constricted club with more left outside the room than seated within. . . .  Legitimate and effective 
multilateral institutions, backed by resources and capable of delivering results, can form an 
interconnecting tissue, reaching across the skeletal architecture of this dynamic, multipolar 
system.”); see also Ramesh Jaura, The Brave New World of Robert Zoellick, GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS 
& POL. ECON. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/04/23/the-brave-new-
world-of-robert-zoellick/. 
 15.  See Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Fund for Fight Against HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases at African Leaders Summit, U.N. 
Press Release SG/SM/7779/Rev.1 (Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Annan Press Release] (discussing 
civil society’s role in developing and implementing the ideas proposed by the Secretary-General); 
see also G.A. Res. S-26/2, ¶¶ 32, 90, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (Aug. 2, 2001) (noting governments’ 
efforts in combating HIV/AIDS should be complemented by the active participation of civil society).   
 16.  The legitimacy of international institutions is important for at least two reasons.  First, it 
may be important to know whether an institution deserves support.  Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in 
International Law and International Relations 7 (Jan. 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900289.  Second, a legitimate institution may be perceived as “more 
likely to be effective or stable.”  Id.   
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an international development institution.  The capacity of NGOs to 
contribute to institutional credibility is a more fruitful inquiry.  These 
concepts are not synonymous.  Legitimacy is about authority, and 
includes a moral component that justifies the state’s monopoly of 
power.17  Credibility is a distinct concept that, as applied to an 
international development institution, relates to our trust in the 
institution’s commitment and ability to set terms and conditions of 
assistance that will advance development.  Arguments in support of 
NGO participation incorrectly conflate legitimacy and credibility.  The 
authority of an institution, like the World Bank or the Global Fund, to set 
the terms and conditions of a loan or grant, i.e., the institution’s 
legitimacy, is not in doubt, regardless of whether its governance structure 
includes NGOs.  Development institutions are international Weberian 
bureaucracies.18  Their legitimacy depends on their complying with the 
preordained mandates of the states that created them; it is derivative from 
the legitimacy of their member states.  What is in doubt, however, is their 
credibility: the ability of institutions, like the World Bank, that exclude 
NGOs from governance to properly calibrate the terms and conditions of 
assistance to achieve the goals we support. 
Having shown why NGOs’ role is not a legitimating one, the Article 
then examines their potential to contribute to institutional credibility.19  
                                                          
 17.  See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 600–01, 601 n.29 (1999) (explaining 
how “‘legitimacy’ refers to the justification of authority” and listing a definition of legitimacy where 
moral goodness serves as a justification (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 41 
(2d ed. 1970))). 
 18.  See infra Part II.D.  Weberian bureaucracies are formal institutions with a “hierarchical 
authority structure,” “specialized administrative staff,” “limited objectives,” different “rewards” 
according to office, and “segmental participation.”  Stanley H. Udy, Jr., “Bureaucracy” and 
“Rationality” in Weber’s Organization Theory: An Empirical Study, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 791, 792–93 
(1959) (italics omitted). 
 19.  Paradoxically, if NGO participation contributes to increased institutional credibility, this 
ultimately could also contribute to institutional legitimacy.  This is so because the legitimacy of an 
implementing bureaucratic organization partly depends on its ability to carry out its assigned tasks.  
Development institutions are technocratic expert organizations, not representative bodies.  See 
Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, in REINVENTING THE WORLD 
BANK, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that the notion of the World Bank as a representative body that 
“speaks for the poor, the oppressed, and the nationally disenfranchised” is misguided because the 
Bank is at heart a development bank, which is a “membership, not a representative organization”); 
see also Kapur, supra note 4, at 75 (“An unpleasant reality of international institutions is that . . . 
they will not be democratic in the sense of democracy as a system of popular control over decision 
making.” (citation omitted) (citing Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be 
Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón 
eds., 1999))).  To the extent that NGOs enhance these institutions’ expertise, they may augment 
these institutions’ legitimacy.  Any such augmentation of an institution’s legitimacy, however, 
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The second stage of the analysis addresses why and how NGOs may 
contribute to credibility and the stakes of advocating for greater NGO 
participation.  I show that credibility is linked to perceptions of 
effectiveness.  Those who advocate for NGO participation in governance 
maintain that NGO participation makes a development institution more 
effective and, therefore, more credible.20  The contested nature of 
credibility and effectiveness in international development make it 
difficult to determine the contribution of NGOs.  Citizens and the 
governments of donor and developing countries, as well as external 
watchdogs like NGOs, have differing views about what is legitimate and, 
therefore, also what is credible and effective.21  This Article focuses on 
credibility from the perspective of donor countries because such 
credibility is crucial to institutional survival: at any time donors can turn 
off the spigot.22  Donors are also the ones that determine whether NGOs 
                                                                                                                       
would result from the expertise the NGOs contribute, not from any notion of democratic 
representation.  Whether NGOs actually have the requisite expertise and whether their participation 
augments the ability of international development institutions to achieve their goals are empirical 
questions that this Article can only frame.  In clarifying the terms of engagement, however, I avoid 
looking to the wrong kind of data, i.e., the extent to which an international development institution is 
representative, to determine legitimacy.  
 20.  See, e.g., ALLISON BLEANEY & CAROLE SAINT-LAURENT, INT’L UNION FOR THE 
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, REVIEW OF PRACTICES ON NGO/CSO PARTICIPATION AND 
RECOMMENDED MEASURES FOR NGO REPRESENTATION AT MEETINGS OF THE CIF TRUST FUND 
COMMITTEES 4–5 (Jan. 2009), in Climate Inv. Funds, Review of Practices on NGO/CSO 
Participation and Proposal for the CIF Committees, SCF/TFC.2/Inf.2, CTF/TFC.2/Inf.2 (Jan. 16, 
2009), http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/Review_of 
_Practices_NGO-CSO_Participation_Final_0.pdf; Annan Press Release, supra note 15; Zoellick, 
supra note 14, at 381; see also Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 893–95 (noting how NGOs benefit the 
international system and arguing that NGOs “correct for the pathologies of governments and 
[international organizations]”). 
 21.  See Bodansky, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that concepts of legitimacy are influenced by 
time, place, and people’s beliefs). 
 22.  This focus is not intended to diminish the importance of credibility in the eyes of 
borrowing and recipient countries.  There is ample evidence, for example, that development projects 
are more effective where there is strong developing country buy-in.  See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 3, at 
506 (describing NGOs created in developing countries by developing country citizens as 
“increasingly effective”).  But it is not an even playing field.  Developing countries’ need for finance 
likely causes many of them to accept the terms and conditions of assistance regardless of their views 
on the effectiveness of the end goal.  The bottom line is that money flowing into a government’s 
coffers usually helps keep that government in power.  Dambisa Moyo, Why Foreign Aid is Hurting 
Africa, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758895999200083.html.  
There may also be a wide disparity between credibility in the eyes of a developing country 
government and credibility in the eyes of the people who live under that government’s domain.  
NGO participation is primarily viewed as increasing institutional credibility when the development 
goal to be achieved requires knowledge of and experience with the grassroots level.  See David 
Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595, 624–25 (2011) (discussing the 
ability of NGOs to connect with local stakeholders).  However, the participation of NGOs in an 
institution may in some cases engender hostility in recipient governments.  See Garry W. Jenkins, 
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are given a role in institutional decision-making.  What is at stake, 
however, is far more significant than institutional survival. 
At a fundamental level, what is at stake is the compatibility of 
international development assistance priorities with norms and ideas of 
global justice.23  Development institutions’ decisions have an enormous 
impact on the lives and wellbeing of developing country citizens.  This is 
especially true in countries where development assistance forms a 
significant part of the public budget.  For example, a country may be 
required to revamp its tax policy to receive a World Bank development 
policy loan.24  Alternatively, a country may need to eliminate logging 
from swaths of territory to qualify for a GEF grant, resulting in a major 
upheaval for those whose livelihoods depend on logging.25  The impact 
of requirements like these will be felt whether or not the international 
development institution is credible or effective.  Proponents of NGO 
participation, however, maintain that NGOs’ participation increases the 
likelihood that an institution’s policies, operations, and practices will be 
sensitive to the needs of affected developing country citizens.26  NGOs 
add value to development initiatives because it is perceived that they can, 
will, and have “asked the turtle.”27  Implicit in this argument is the view 
                                                                                                                       
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them: Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 
37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 482 (2012).  Frequently, the value of NGO participation is precisely their 
ability to provide input about the needs of a developing country’s citizens that its government would 
prefer to ignore.  See id. (noting the fraught relationship between some developing countries’ 
governments and human rights and environmental NGOs). 
 23.  See generally Erin Kelly, Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives, in THE ETHICS OF 
ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY, supra note 2, at 177 (discussing the interaction 
of principles of global justice and international development assistance); Richard W. Miller, Moral 
Closeness and World Community, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT 
NEEDY, supra note 2, at 101 (same). 
 24.  See, e.g., The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Program Document for a Third Development Policy Loan in the Amount of €400 Million (US$ 560.6 
Million Equivalent) to Romania, at 9–10, Report No. 64772-RO (Nov. 20, 2011). 
 25.  See, e.g., The World Bank, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund Grant Agreement 
(Amazon Region Protected Areas Project) Between Fundo Brasileiro Para a Biodiversidade-
FUNBIO and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, at 39, GEF Trust Fund Grant 
No. TF051240 (Oct. 24, 2002). 
 26.  See infra Part III.A. 
 27.  See Donna Brazile, Donna Brazile Shares the Best Advice She Ever Got, OPRAH. 
COM (June 2010), http://www.oprah.com/money/Donna-Braziles-Rules-to-Live-By-the-Smartest-
Advice-She-Got.  On a field trip as a geology student, Gloria Steinem came across a large snapping 
turtle in an embankment at the side of a road by a river.  Id.  Assuming that the turtle was about to 
cross the road and worried that it would get crushed by a car, Steinem picked it up and carried it 
back to the river.  Id.  When she told her professor about the incident, he pointed out that the turtle 
likely spent at least a month climbing up to the embankment from the river to lay its eggs in the mud 
there.  Id.  Chagrined, Steinem recounted the incident to Donna Brazile to illustrate the important 
lesson of first asking others what kind of aid they need before rushing in with the aid we assume 
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that fairness demands us to ensure that the terms and conditions of 
development assistance that our development institutions impose are 
congruent with achieving goals we support.28  Absent such congruence, 
the huge impact of development assistance on local populations is 
unjustifiable. 
The third stage reviews evidence that NGO participation in 
governance enhances a development institution’s credibility and 
examines the conditions that must be satisfied to maximize the likelihood 
that participation will have that effect.  We need objective empirical 
research to determine the first aspect, but such research has not been 
done.29  Drawing on case studies of recent practice, however, we can 
make some overall observations.  First, as NGOs have become opinion 
leaders for international development assistance, they have mobilized 
public support and pushed international institutions to act.30  They 
condition their support, however, on their being allowed to participate in 
the governance of the institutions they urge governments to create.31  
Simply put, for an institution to have credibility in the eyes of NGOs, 
NGOs must participate in the institution’s governance.  Given these 
power dynamics, NGO participation in governance in new international 
development institutions has become the norm.32  Secondly, it appears 
that the potential of NGO participation to contribute to credibility is 
strengthened by institutions’ investment of significant resources to devise 
systems for selecting and monitoring NGOs.33  These systems help 
address concerns about NGO accountability and conflict of interest, 
which were obstacles to NGO participation in the past.34  Thirdly, 
                                                                                                                       
they need.  See id. 
 28.  See Pogge, supra note 2, at 276–77 (arguing that to the extent that institutions like the 
World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the World Bank knowingly or unwittingly pursue policies 
that hurt the global poor, they are part of a global order that is unjust). 
 29.  As noted by David Gartner in Beyond the Monopoly of States, supra note 22, at 627 n.129, 
the Global Fund has published a report that maintains, or suggests, that the extensive NGO 
participation for which it provides has enhanced its results.  However, we need an independent view. 
 30.  See Pincus & Winters, supra note 19, at 18–20 (noting that NGO protests against the World 
Bank have led the Bank to undertake many initiatives, a response that Pincus and Winters maintain 
has resulted in the Bank’s loss of focus). 
 31.  See, e.g., SIERRA, supra note 10, at 3 (arguing for private sector participation on the Green 
Climate Fund’s board). 
 32.  See id. at 6–7 (noting that the private sector increasingly participates in the governance of 
public pooled funds, and listing examples). 
 33.  See Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the 
Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1054–63 (2011) (discussing 
accreditation approaches of various international organizations). 
 34.  See id. at 1020 (noting that lack of a clear goal, poor governance, and managers interested 
only in their own benefit make NGO participation less appealing to international organizations). 
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participation is not one size fits all.  Competing models of NGO 
participation coexist without apparent damage to credibility.35  
Moreover, the scope of NGO participation can be dynamic as an 
institution grows and shifts.36 
Lastly, the new norm of NGO inclusion clearly has implications for 
the credibility of institutions that exclude NGOs from governance.  Tired 
of hitting institutional glass ceilings in the World Bank and the UN, 
NGOs have urged donors to build new sandboxes in which to play in the 
form of autonomous special purpose funds.37  As a result, in recent years, 
most major new multilateral development initiatives have involved 
creating new special purpose funds.38  This proliferation of new 
institutions is costly in many ways.39  These costs warrant considering 
whether opening up the governance of the World Bank and the UN to 
NGO participation in some way might allow for a better consolidation of 
resources and thereby reduce the inclination towards institutional 
proliferation. 
This Article’s examination of these issues proceeds as follows.  Part 
II defines key terms and analyzes the legitimacy of an international 
development institution.  It shows that the claim that NGO participation 
in institutional governance is critical to institutional legitimacy misstates 
the case for NGO participation.  The case for increased NGO 
participation in governance is really based on how NGO participation 
can aid credibility.  Part III.A reviews current legal scholarship on the 
contribution of NGOs to international institutions.  It shows how this 
scholarship supports the view that NGO participation in institutional 
governance has the potential to contribute significantly to a development 
institution’s credibility.  Part III.B reviews case studies of NGOs’ 
participation in governance.  Part III.C reviews inferences drawn from 
recent scholarship and practice about what NGO participation in 
                                                          
 35.  See id. at 1059–65 (describing different ways in which NGOs may participate in 
international organizations). 
 36.  See id. at 1020 (discussing how NGOs and international institutions constantly evolve and 
change). 
 37.  See Sophie Smyth, Collective Action for Development Finance, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 961, 
966 (2011). 
 38.  See id. (listing examples of recently created special purpose funds). 
 39.  See, e.g., id. at 969 (stating that gaps in governance and accountability in newly created 
funds, as well as political and legal uncertainty, create costs for international aid); see also Sebastian 
Mallaby, Saving the World Bank, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2005, at 75, 75 (noting the creation of 
new funds and the disinterest in maintenance of existing institutions). 
SMYTH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:02 PM 
386 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
governance contributes to the credibility of an international development 
institution.  Part IV concludes. 
II. LEGITIMACY AND NGOS 
A. Terms and Concepts 
The claim that participation of NGOs possessing relevant expertise 
and experience in an institution’s governance is critical to the 
institution’s legitimacy initially begs several questions about the 
definition of terms.  What do we mean by “NGO,” “participation,” and 
“legitimacy,” and what exactly is “relevant experience and expertise?” 
1. NGO 
“NGO” is a broad and elusive term.  As Anna-Karin Lindblom 
points out, there is a wide spectrum of definitions of the term that vary 
according to the circumstances of its use.40  “Each institution has its own 
definition elaborated for its own purposes.”41  Lindblom, however, 
identifies four elements of an NGO that apply across the range of 
existing definitions in international law.  An NGO is: (a) autonomous 
from the state;42 (b) not-for-profit, which Lindblom defines as requiring 
that the entity “do[es] not have the primary aim of making a profit”;43 (c) 
not connected to violence or crime;44 and (d) an organization, meaning 
that it has “the capacity . . . to act in its own name within [a national and] 
international legal context.”45  The definition of the term “NGO” found 
in international development includes these components but generally 
excludes political parties.46 
The idea of including NGOs in any capacity in the work of 
international development institutions has always proceeded on the 
                                                          
 40.  See ANNA-KARIN LINDBLOM, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 36 (2005) (explaining that “each area of law that relates to NGOs establishes its own 
definition” for the term). 
 41.  Id. at 44. 
 42.  Id. at 46–47. 
 43.  Id. at 48 (quoting COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON THE STATUS OF 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN EUROPE AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM para. 4 
(Nov. 13, 2002), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/ONG/Fundamental%20Principles% 
20E.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44.  Id. at 49. 
 45.  Id. at 50 (emphasis omitted). 
 46.  Id. at 48. 
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assumption that only those with relevant expertise and experience will be 
considered.  This principle is clearly evident, for example, in Article 71 
of the UN Charter, the provision that controls UN development agencies’ 
engagement with NGOs.  Article 71 provides that the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), the body that oversees all of the UN’s 
development activities, under the authority of the General Assembly, 
may “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence.”47 
The arrangements ECOSOC drafted pursuant to Article 71 reflect the 
principle that the level of an NGO’s participation should vary according 
to the nature of the NGO.  In short, the tighter the fit between ECOSOC 
and an NGO’s objectives, the greater the participation allowed, subject, 
however, to certain immovable limits.48  Similarly, the GEF’s criteria for 
NGO eligibility in the GEF-NGO Network (the vehicle for NGO 
involvement in the GEF) require that the NGO “specifically include 
environment protection and sustainable use as one of its important 
objectives.”49  The criteria also require that an NGO have a “proven track 
record of addressing environmental management issues relevant to one 
or more focal areas of the GEF for three or more years.”50 
As for what kind of expertise is relevant in development, NGOs’ 
expected contribution is closely, although not exclusively, tied to the fact 
that NGOs have affiliations with and exposure to the grassroots levels of 
developing country citizens.  NGOs are seen as having unique and 
needed expertise because they are extensively involved in the delivery of 
                                                          
 47.  U.N. Charter art. 71 (emphasis added). 
 48.  See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 252–53 (1997).  ECOSOC’s original arrangements 
established two categories of NGOs.  Category A NGOs were “those with a basic interest in most of 
the activities of [ECOSOC].”  Id. at 253.  Category B NGOs were “those interested in some aspects 
of [ECOSOC’s] work.”  Id.  NGOs’ consultative status varies according to how they are categorized.  
See E.S.C. Res. 1968/1296, ¶¶ 15–19, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1968/1296 (May 23, 1968).  The ECOSOC 
arrangements also reflect the principle that NGO participation in ECOSOC’s work would not mean 
participation in all aspects of ECOSOC’s work.  See id. ¶¶ 20–22 (noting specified activities 
organizations could participate in).  All NGOs were excluded from some of ECOSOC’s activities.  
For example, although some of ECOSOC’s work is done through functional and regional 
commissions, MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 116–17 (2004), ECOSOC decided against 
allowing NGO participation in its commissions at that time.  Charnovitz, supra, at 253. 
 49.  GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE OPERATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF THE GEF-NGO NETWORK 32 (vers. 1.2 2010) [hereinafter GEF-NGO NETWORK 
REVISED RULES], available at http://gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid=154. 
 50.  Id. 
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international development aid and the implementation of aid-funded 
projects.51  The World Bank, for example, publicly acknowledges that 
NGO strengths commonly include “social proximity (grassroots and 
community links), . . . field-based development expertise, . . . [and] 
important specialized knowledge or skills.”52  The Bank also 
acknowledges the importance of NGOs’ role in offering “grassroots 
insights and [in] challeng[ing] conventional development thinking.”53 
The GEF and Global Fund’s reliance on NGOs for local expertise is 
apparent in their requirements that a certain number of the NGO 
representatives who participate in those funds be drawn from local 
NGOs.54  Indeed, the Global Fund goes one step further to include the 
voice of developing country citizens by requiring that one NGO 
representative on its Board be either “a person living with HIV/AIDs or 
from a community living with tuberculosis or malaria.”55  As discussed 
below, the methods that institutions use to screen and continually 
monitor whether included NGOs have relevant experience and expertise 
have become increasingly sophisticated. 
2. Participation 
Participation connotes a continuum of ways in which those affected 
by an institution can participate.56  “The weakest form of participation is 
mere availability of information, or transparency . . . .”57  A more 
                                                          
 51.  See Spar & Dail, supra note 5, at 172 (noting how “NGOs have become major conduits for 
development aid” and perform important community functions). 
 52.  THE WORLD BANK, GP 14.70 - OPERATIONAL MANUAL: INVOLVING NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN BANK-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES para. 6 (July 1998) [hereinafter WBGP 14.70], 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/GLBEMFJEG0. 
 53.  Id. para. 7.  
 54.  See GEF-NGO NETWORK REVISED RULES, supra note 49, at 2–3; THE GLOBAL FUND TO 
FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, BY-LAWS art. 7.1 (2011), http://www.theglobalfund 
.org/documents/core/bylaws/Core_GlobalFund_Bylaws_en/ [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS].  
The NGO Coordination Committee of the GEF-NGO Network, for example, consists of up to fifteen 
NGO representatives elected from different geographic regions, along with three representatives of 
indigenous people’s organizations from three main regions.  GEF-NGO NETWORK REVISED RULES, 
supra note 49, at 2–3. 
 55.  GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS, supra note 54, art. 7.1.  The Global Fund’s by-laws also require 
that the NGO representatives include one representative of a developing country NGO and one 
representative of a developed country NGO.  Id.  
 56.  See Norman Uphoff, Fitting Projects to People, in PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: SOCIOLOGICAL 
VARIABLES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT 359, 377 tbl.12-1 (Michael M. Cernea ed., 1985) (listing 
different ways beneficiaries can participate in aid projects). 
 57.  Monica Hlavac, A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, in COERCION AND THE STATE 203, 215 (D.A. Reidy & W.J. Riker eds., 2008) (emphasis 
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substantive form of participation allows a “two-way transferring of 
information” as, for example, when a national institution allows 
individuals to petition it as opposed to a “one-way offering of 
information from the [institution] to its subjects.”58  The strongest form 
of participation consists of equal voting rights.59  This Article is 
concerned with the participation of NGOs in institutional governance.  
This is distinguishable from NGO participation in project and program 
implementation, which is now routine at varying levels in both 
multilateral and bilateral development assistance.60  In fact, it is the very 
depth of their experience as implementers of international development 
projects that NGOs claim gives them currency and credence to 
participate in institutional governance.61  As detailed below, however, 
participation in governance can vary greatly in the degree of influence it 
allows. 
3. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy with regard to the governance of a state means the 
justified monopoly of power.62  When a state has justified power, it has 
legitimate authority.63  So, institutions are legitimate, that is, they have 
justified authority, when some justification exists for the power they 
wield.  A criminal gang, for example, may wield power in the form of 
force and even have a monopoly of power within some area.  But a 
criminal gang cannot wield authority because its use of power or force is 
not legitimated by any justification.64 
                                                                                                                       
omitted). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  See NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR 
BORROWERS 201 (2006) (describing the operational role of NGOs); Spar & Dail, supra note 5, at 
172 (noting that “NGOs have become major conduits for development aid”). 
 61.  See, e.g., BLEANEY & SAINT-LAURENT, supra note 20, at 11 (listing expertise as a key 
value of increased NGO participation). 
 62.  See Bodansky, supra note 17, at 600 (defining legitimacy as “a quality that leads people . . . 
to accept authority—independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational persuasion—because of a 
general sense that the authority is justified”); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy 
of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 409–10 (2006) (“To say that an 
institution is legitimate implies that it has the right to rule even if it does not act in accordance with 
the rational self-interest of everyone who is subject to its rule.”). 
 63.  See Bodansky, supra note 17, at 601 (“‘Legitimate authority’ simply means ‘justified 
authority’. . . .”). 
 64.  See id. (listing examples of justifications that support legitimacy, including legality). 
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For authority to exist, the people within the jurisdiction of the power 
must regard the power as legitimate.65  While state legitimacy entails the 
monopoly of power, a government can also delegate power within itself, 
as in executive bureaucracies, or outside itself, as in corporations.66  In 
both cases the state or the corporation’s authority derives from some 
rational legal connection to the state that conferred it.  The right of a state 
or rulemaking institution to command obedience independent of its 
impact on the immediate self-interest of the persons who have to obey, 
i.e., the legitimacy of the state or rulemaking institution, derives from its 
authority.67 
The term “legitimacy” refers to two distinct concepts: normative 
legitimacy and sociological legitimacy.68  Authority is normatively 
legitimate if “it is justified in some objective sense.”69  What justifies 
authority depends on arguments about moral, political, and legal 
theory.70  Normative legitimacy focuses on the qualities of the ruler that 
morally justify its authority.  For example, authority may be deemed 
justified if it derives from a democratic process or, in other societies, 
from a divine right.71  The moral justification of authority has “normative 
consequences for those subject to the . . . authority.”72  In contrast, 
authority is legitimate in the sociological sense if relevant audiences 
perceive it as justified and therefore accept it.73  This is an external test 
                                                          
 65.  See id. at 600. 
 66.  See MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 
196, 196 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1970) (describing the distribution of authority 
and bureaucracy in the public and private domain). 
 67.  See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 409–10 (noting that an institution’s legitimacy 
is not affected by its failure to act in the self-interest of people under its power). 
 68.  Bodansky, supra note 17, at 601. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See id. at 602 (listing fairness, justice, consent, and other normative criteria as bearing on 
the question of legitimacy). 
 71.  See id. at 601 (noting that a variety of factors might justify an actor’s right to exercise 
authority including “tradition, rationality, legality, and democracy”). 
 72.  Bodansky, supra note 16, at 7.  As noted by Bodansky, however, “[p]hilosophers disagree 
about the nature of those normative consequences.”  Id. at 7 n.6.  Some take the view that the right to 
rule “entails a corresponding moral duty to obey on the part of those subject to the institution’s 
authority.”  Id. (citations omitted) (quoting JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); A. 
John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 109 ETHICS 739 (1999); John Tasioulas, The 
Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Samantha 
Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010)).  “[O]thers conceptualize the right to rule as a power to create 
legal as opposed to moral duties.”  Id. (citation omitted) (citing Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy 
Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 221 (2010)). 
 73.  See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 405 (stating that wide belief in an institution’s 
right to rule constitutes sociological legitimacy). 
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that includes moral justifications, although it does not make any 
judgment about the validity of those justifications.74  The answer to what 
makes an institution’s authority sociologically legitimate depends on 
empirical and explanatory arguments about what people believe and 
why.75  This Article’s discussion of legitimacy centers on international 
development institutions’ normative legitimacy.  Although legitimacy is 
often used to describe what NGO participation contributes to an 
international development institution, I maintain that legitimacy is 
actually the wrong frame within which to consider what NGOs bring to 
the table. 
B. How Legitimacy Is Determined 
The legitimacy of international institutions, including international 
development institutions, has attracted considerable attention in recent 
scholarship.76  The normative and sociological legitimacy of international 
                                                          
 74.  See Bodansky, supra note 16, at 8 (describing descriptive legitimacy as “conceptually 
parasitic on normative legitimacy”). 
 75.  See id. at 14–15.  The sociological legitimacy of international institutions depends on the 
answers to a set of empirical inquiries about the kinds of factors and qualities that would make an 
international institution’s authority accepted.  Id.  “International institutions have multiple audiences 
and constituencies and affect many different actors.  So[,] a wide variety of actors are potentially 
relevant in determining an institution’s . . . legitimacy.”  Id. at 16.  The first challenge in assessing an 
international institution’s legitimacy, therefore, is to identify the relevant actors to be surveyed.  
Even when the relevant actors are identified, however, further difficulties arise in determining their 
views on an institution’s legitimacy.  See id. at 17 (noting “any methodology w[ould] be imperfect 
and often it may be impracticable to get the necessary evidence”).  An international institution’s 
actors and audiences may also have widely differing views of the definition of legitimacy.  Id. at 18. 
 76.  See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999); Bodansky, supra note 16; Daniel C. Esty, 
Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 
1495, 1515–23 (2006) (arguing “institutions must adopt basic administrative law procedures to 
achieve better results and bolster public confidence [in them]” and discussing types of legitimacy); 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 16–17 (noting organizations are 
looking to administrative law procedures to boost legitimacy).  International institutions pose a 
legitimacy concern because they often exercise broad powers that have a major impact on the lives 
of citizens in the countries affected by them.  See Hlavac, supra note 57, at 206 (“The particular 
critique that [global governance institutions (GGIs)] lack legitimacy embodies a very specific 
concern, that GGIs wield power by directing rules towards states that adversely affect people, yet are 
not accountable for this power.  This concern specifically targets GGI activities occurring beyond 
the control of those affected by them.”).  The scale of this impact prompts consideration of whether 
these institutions’ exercise of authority is justified.  Why should these nameless, faceless 
international entities have the power to constrain and interfere with individuals’ freedoms?  Impact is 
irrelevant to legitimacy, but impact gets our attention nevertheless.  See Esty, supra, at 1512–14 
(suggesting that concern about the legitimacy of an international institution increases in proportion 
to the degree to which the issues the institution seeks to address are politically sensitive and 
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institutions depends on the same sources of authority that states rely on 
to justify their right to rule, such as democratic accountability, religion, 
and tradition.77  Yet, just as individual states can delegate authority to 
rational bureaucracies to implement their decisions, states acting together 
can also create a bureaucracy to implement their collective will.  In those 
circumstances, the legitimacy of that institution depends upon the extent 
to which it carries out the will of the original states whose legitimacy it 
rests upon.78 
If a bureaucracy exceeds the power granted to it, fails to exercise its 
power to solve the problem it was created to eliminate, or uses its power 
foolishly or corruptly so as to fail to solve its assigned task, that 
bureaucracy will be ineffective or worse.79  Such an institution lacks 
credibility because, like a machine that malfunctions, it cannot achieve 
its intended, legitimate, ends.  A bureaucracy’s only purpose is to 
rationally implement the will of the states that created it.80  Absent that 
ability, or commitment, there is no justification for its exercising the 
power granted it.  Evaluating the legitimacy of a bureaucracy, therefore, 
is different from evaluating the legitimacy of the state institutions that 
created it.  Unlike the normative questions of justice by which states are 
judged, bureaucracies are judged by their ability to achieve specific 
ends.81 
As Monica Hlavac observes, “institutions [vary] in their capacities 
and functions, and as they do what legitimacy demands of them [varies] 
too.”82  Any test of an institution’s legitimacy, therefore, should take 
                                                                                                                       
normatively charged, and examining legitimacy implications in different scenarios). 
 77.  See Bodanksy, supra note 16, at 5. 
 78.  But cf. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 76, at 709 (“The legitimacy of rational-legal 
authority suggests that [international organizations] may have an authority independent of the 
policies and interests of states that create them . . . .”). 
 79.  See id. at 715. 
 80.  See WEBER, supra note 66, at 196 (stating that bureaucracies need to fulfill the duties 
delegated to them by their creator). 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  Hlavac, supra note 57, at 210.  “If we specify broad conditions for [international 
institution] legitimacy we run the risk of abstracting away from important differences among 
[international institutions].”  Id. at 209.  This approach differs from the uniform approach taken by 
some scholars, notably, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane.  Referring to international institutions 
as “global governance institutions” (GGIs), Buchanan and Keohane offer an ad hoc approach, which 
they label a “complex standard of legitimacy,” as a test for assessing the legitimacy of GGIs.  
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 432.  The standard is comprised of three elements: 
First, [GGIs] should enjoy the ongoing consent of democratic states. . . .  Second, [GGIs] 
should satisfy the substantive criteria of minimal moral acceptability, comparative 
benefit, and institutional integrity.  Third, [GGIs] should possess the epistemic virtues 
needed to make credible judgments about whether the three substantive criteria are 
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account of the following: (1) the type of authority the institution 
exercises, (2) the issues involved, and (3) the degree to which the 
authority exercised is autonomous and binding.83  The kind of authority 
international development institutions are created to wield, for example, 
is clearly distinguishable from the kind of authority legislatures or 
adjudicatory bodies wield.  The closest domestic analogy to the kind of 
authority an international development institution wields is the kind 
exercised by governmental administrative agencies or executive 
bureaucracies, such as the authority of the Department of Transportation 
or United States Agency for International Development. 
The analogy between the kind of authority exercised by many U.S. 
administrative agencies and certain international institutions whose 
origins and function are like administrative agencies is well 
documented.84  Strong parallels exist between the recent proliferation of 
international institutions and emerging concerns about their legitimacy, 
and the proliferation of administrative agencies in the United States and 
                                                                                                                       
satisfied and to achieve the ongoing contestation and critical revision of their goals, their 
terms of accountability, and ultimately their role in a division of labor for the pursuit of 
global justice, through their interaction with effective external epistemic agents.   
Id. at 432–33.   
  The Buchanan–Keohane standard does not differentiate between the nature of the 
governance-like powers an institution has been created to exercise, i.e., adjudicatory, legislative, 
regulatory, or some combination thereof.  In their view, therefore, the legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court (which they expressly include within the definition of GGI), id. at 406, can and 
should be judged according to the same standard as an international development institution such as 
the World Bank.  Recent scholarly critiques of the Buchanan–Keohane approach favor a more 
localized approach.  See, e.g., Hlavac, supra note 57, at 223.  Buchanan and Keohane make a 
significant contribution to the issue of international institution legitimacy.  They correctly identify a 
strong need for a standard on which to base principled criticism of international institutions.  See 
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 405 (noting disagreement exists on the concept of 
normative legitimacy).  They also usefully underscore the key aspects of an institution that such a 
criticism should address, such as comparative benefit, institutional integrity, and transparency.  Id. at 
422–24, 427–29.  Their argument that such a standard should be different from the standard of 
legitimacy that applies to a sovereign state’s exercise of legislative power, see id. at 406 (stating the 
differences between governments and international institutions), is also persuasive.  But it is not 
clear why from that conclusion they make the leap that one standard of legitimacy for international 
institutions should fit all.  A second weakness in their approach is that they assume that the 
normative legitimacy of an institution is key to an institution’s capacity to deliver the benefits it has 
been created to provide.  Id. at 408.  In fact, this assumption may not be true as an empirical matter.  
See Bodanksy, supra note 16, at 18–19 (noting the need for empirical studies on whether actors’ 
perceptions of legitimacy, which can be based on normative factors, contribute to an institution’s 
success). 
 83.  Bodansky, supra note 16, at 14. 
 84.  See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing that “much of global 
governance can be understood and analyzed as administrative action,” distinguishable from acts that 
are either legislative or judicial); see also Esty, supra note 76, at 1494 (arguing that rules and 
procedures associated with administrative law can lend legitimacy to global institutions). 
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similar related concerns in the wake of the New Deal.85  The upshot of 
these parallels is that the test that has evolved for evaluating the 
legitimacy of U.S. administrative agencies and their exercise of their 
power can serve as a useful guide for evaluating the legitimacy of 
analogous international institutions. 
That test for the legitimacy of a U.S. administrative agency 
crystallized when the New Deal Congress created “a raft of new federal 
regulatory agencies and endowed them with very broad powers.”86  
Democratic anxieties intensified in the face of this expansive delegation 
of governmental power.87  The new federal agencies were attacked as a 
fourth, and illegitimate, branch of government.88  In defense of the 
agencies’ legitimacy, James Landis “appealed to the notion of regulatory 
management by experts.”89  The new agencies, he argued, were staffed 
by “expert administrators [who] would adopt measures to secure . . . 
public interest goals.”90  The source of the agencies’ authority was their 
normative legitimacy: their expertise91 and an express mandate from 
Congress.92 
C. Legitimacy as Efficacy 
The principle that an institution’s legitimacy is (a) derived from the 
legitimacy of the government that created it and (b) a product of the 
degree to which it complies with its predetermined nonadjudicatory 
mandate, applies equally to an intergovernmental bureaucracy.  This 
principle, although applied by U.S. courts to clarify the legitimacy of the 
U.S. regulatory state,93 was not hatched in U.S. jurisprudence.  Rather, it 
                                                          
 85.  See Esty, supra note 76, at 1494. 
 86.  Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 440 (2003). 
 87.  Id. (citing McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 180, 191–92 (1999)). 
 88.  Id. (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984)). 
 89.  Id. (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6–46 (1938)). 
 90.  Id. at 441.   
 91.  Id. at 440–41. 
 92.  See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
369, 371–75 (1989) (analyzing legislation as directives given to implementers such as agencies). 
 93.  See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974) (“[A]gency power to make rules that 
affect substantial individual rights and obligations carries with it the responsibility . . . to remain 
consistent with the governing legislation . . . .”). 
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dates back to classic Weberian analysis of bureaucracy.94  In short, the 
ultimate test of a bureaucracy’s legitimacy is its efficacy.  Efficacy, as 
used in this Article, means the extent to which a bureaucracy complies 
with the mandate predetermined for it by the state or states that created it, 
in accordance with any rules and procedures established by the state or 
states. 
Importantly, efficacy is not merely effectiveness.  The effectiveness 
of a state agency relates only to its ability to achieve the goals assigned 
to it.  However, an agency is efficacious when it accomplishes the 
assigned task using only the powers delegated to it, and the procedures it 
is permitted to use.  For example, if the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is asked to eliminate traffic jams, it could 
accomplish this by studying the causes of the situation and suggesting 
alternative driving practices, transportation mixes, or other civil 
engineering designs.95  Alternatively, the DOT could set out to shoot 
every third car owner.  No doubt the latter option would be effective but 
it would not be efficacious.  Legitimacy, therefore, requires not only that 
an agency meets its goals, but that it do so using only those powers 
prescribed to it by the legislature.  This confluence of procedural justice 
and effectiveness are the basis of bureaucratic legitimacy. 
Although the standard for evaluating the legitimacy of a bureaucracy 
includes questions of procedural justice,96 appropriate procedures for a 
bureaucracy differ from those that would be appropriate for other 
institutions of the state.97  For example, to be just, a legislature requires 
equal representation.  Yet, we would not consider holding a general 
election to determine whether someone is guilty of a crime to be 
appropriate procedure.  Instead, adjudication is the correct procedure for 
a court to employ.  A court must achieve the goals assigned to it by using 
the procedures that are appropriate to adjudicating the law.  For a 
bureaucracy, legitimacy rests in rationally applying its substantive 
expertise to solve the problems assigned to it.  In other words, legitimacy 
for a bureaucracy rests on its efficaciousness.  And efficaciousness 
                                                          
 94.  See WEBER, supra note 66, at 196 (describing characteristics of bureaucracies including 
state delegation of duties and bureaucracies’ fulfillment of these duties). 
 95.  See 49 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (listing duties of the Secretary of Transportation, including 
“promot[ing] and undertak[ing] research and development related to transportation”). 
 96.  See Bodansky, supra note 16, at 3 (naming the procedural factors of transparency, 
participation, and neutrality as part of the concept of legitimacy). 
 97.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86 (1971) (noting that “background circumstances 
define a fair procedure”). 
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means applying its expertise to successfully achieve the goals assigned to 
it. 
Sometimes, however, an agency cannot be efficacious not because 
the ends are unachievable but because it has not been given the authority 
to use the procedures necessary to solve the problem assigned to it.  
Suppose, for example, that a state decides to provide financing to help 
address the problem of HIV/AIDS in the developing world.  Its 
legislature appropriates $25 million to the state’s development aid 
agency for the purpose of preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS.  
However, the legislation provides that the agency may employ only 
expertise founded in the King James version of the Bible.  This leads the 
agency to reject any birth control measures and pursue an abstinence-
only policy.98  In this case, the agency follows the procedures given it, 
but the expertise fails to solve the problem.  In this case the agency is 
employing legitimate authority but it is neither efficacious nor effective. 
Merely following the will of the delegating authority is not 
necessarily sufficient to make an agency effective.  For an agency of 
government to be effective, it must (a) be given procedures to follow that 
can achieve the goals assigned to it, and (b) follow the procedures 
assigned to it.99  Under this standard, legitimacy for a bureaucratic 
institution does not require widespread representation.  That procedure is 
required at the legislative stage.  Rather, legitimacy for a bureaucracy 
requires that it possess appropriate expertise to rationally apply to a 
problem to achieve assigned goals.100 
If this is true, then it is not NGOs’ ability to represent more diverse 
viewpoints in an international development institution’s decision-making 
that lends legitimacy to the institution.  Rather, NGOs might enhance the 
legitimacy of the institution by using their expertise and experience to 
develop methods for solving the problems assigned to it.  In the case of 
the World Bank, some scholars believe that the Bank’s modus operandi, 
making loans for projects and structural adjustment, are as ill-suited to 
development as abstinence-only measures are to stopping the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.101  If so, the Bank may be destined for the dust bin of history.  
                                                          
 98.  See 1 Corinthians 6:18 (King James) (commanding that one should “[f]lee fornication”). 
 99.  See RAWLS, supra note 97, at 86 (noting the importance of “a correct or fair procedure” and 
proper compliance with such procedure). 
 100.  See WEBER, supra note 66, at 216 (“The more complicated and specialized modern culture 
becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly 
‘objective’ expert . . . .”). 
 101.  See, e.g., Pincus & Winters, supra note 19, at 17 (stating that the assumption that the 
 
SMYTH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:02 PM 
2012] NGOS AND LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 397 
However, other scholars argue that the Bank’s loan methodology is 
perfectly suited to the task so long as it is used for the correct policies.102  
If NGOs can use their expertise to help the loan programs of the Bank 
more effectively achieve development, then their participation will prove 
both effective and efficacious.  As a consequence, they will help protect 
the legitimacy of the Bank as a development institution. 
D. International Development Institution Efficacy 
International development institutions clearly qualify as international 
administrative entities.  The status of the World Bank—one of the 
world’s oldest and largest international development institutions103—as 
an international bureaucracy is well-established.104  Indeed, as captured 
by Ngaire Woods, the founders’ vision of the Bank was as a consummate 
Weberian bureaucracy: 
The founders of the IMF and World Bank created them to help balance 
growth in the world economy.  They wrote charters for the institutions 
directing them to . . . , [inter alia,] develop the productive resources of 
all member countries.  In each institution these goals were to be 
achieved through a pooling of resources, credit risk, and information 
and research capacity. . . .  Politics and political influence would be 
kept out of [the] institutions.  Boards of proficient technocrats would 
run them, and highly trained economists would staff them.105 
While the vision of the World Bank and the IMF as nonpolitical 
institutions was not realized,106 their essential character as bureaucracies 
remains accurate.  Similarly, the founding members of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN entity with primary 
responsibility for the UN’s development activities,107 saw UNDP as an 
                                                                                                                       
“content, design, and implementation” of Bank policies are beyond criticism is not warranted); John 
Sender, Reassessing the Role of the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa, in REINVENTING THE 
WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 185, 189 (noting that “the World Bank’s policy prescriptions have 
always been predicted by heterodox economic theory to be harmful to the development prospects of 
sub-Saharan Africa”).  
 102.  See Pincus & Winters, supra note 19, at 15–16 (discussing arguments for aid selectivity). 
 103.  See WOODS, supra note 60, at 7 (noting that the Bank’s staff numbers more than 10,000 
and it was created in the 1940s). 
 104.  See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 76, at 709–10 (noting the Bank’s bureaucratic 
characteristics); Pincus & Winters, supra note 19, at 1. 
 105.  WOODS, supra note 60, at 2. 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  The UN’s development work is spread across multiple entities, including UNDP, and 
coordinated by ECOSOC.  KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 115.  The UN is “a source of 
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entity that would provide technical training to developing countries 
(technical assistance) in a range of areas.108  As government 
bureaucracies, therefore, these institutions’ legitimacy depends, firstly, 
on their efficacy, i.e., the degree to which they comply with their 
member-imposed mandates. 
So what is an international development institution’s mandate?  The 
mandate of all international development institutions is to finance the 
general and specific development needs of developing countries.109  They 
                                                                                                                       
economic and technical assistance for numerous underdeveloped countries.”  Pierre de Senarclens, 
The United Nations As a Social and Economic Regulator, in REGULATING GLOBALIZATION: 
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8, 9 (Pierre de Senarclens & Ali Kazancigil eds., 
2007).  Although the “maintenance of peace was the main objective for the foundation of the United 
Nations Organization,” its founders believed that governments could not achieve international 
security without “strong international cooperation aimed at promoting economic progress and social 
welfare, . . . goals . . . reflected in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter.”  Id. at 10.  “Various 
UN-related organizations, such as the UNDP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO)” provide development assistance.  J. SAMUEL BARKIN, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION: THEORIES AND INSTITUTIONS 107 (2006).  Of these, UNDP is the most directly 
focused on development, providing technical assistance to countries in need.  Id.  UNDP, established 
in 1965, is governed by an Executive Board consisting of thirty-six rotating members.  THOMAS 
WINDERL, UNDP JPO SERVICE CENTRE, UNDP FOR BEGINNERS: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 4, 14 (4.1 ed. 2011), http://www.jposc.org/ 
documents/UNDP_for_Beginners_en.pdf.  The Board aims to operate by consensus.  Decisions of 
the Executive Board, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/ 
home/operations/executive_board/decisions_of_theboard/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).  Its regular 
funding derives from voluntary contributions from governments of member states.  WINDERL, supra, 
at 23. 
 108.  See LAWRENCE ZIRING, ROBERT RIGGS & JACK PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 495–96 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that technical 
assistance, involving the “teaching of skills and new technologies,” accounted for a significant 
portion of the energies and funds of programs like UNDP). 
 109.  See, e.g., Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD Articles of 
Agreement]; Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility, 
Mar. 16, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1273, para. 2, at 1285 [hereinafter GEF Instrument]; THE GLOBAL FUND 
TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT § II (2001) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT], available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/library/ 
documents (under “Core Documents” heading); A World of Development Experience, UNITED 
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012).   
  The specific contractual nature of the World Bank and other development institutions’ 
interactions with borrower and recipient countries casts doubt on whether international development 
institutions are properly classified as global governance institutions, as, for example, Monica Hlavac 
has classified global governance.  Hlavac, supra note 57, at 203.  Governance, it is generally held, 
“involves making decisions for a collective—decisions that not merely affect others indirectly, but 
are directed at them and are intended, in some way, to constrain their behavior.”  Bodansky, supra 
note 16, at 5.  The decisions have an other-directed quality that “substitute[s] the ruler’s judgment 
for that of its subjects.”  Id.  While Bank loans and other development assistance agreements have 
the effect of imposing sweeping terms and conditions on borrowing and recipient countries, it is not 
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fulfill this mandate by entering into contractual arrangements with 
borrowing or recipient countries on a case-by-case basis.110  These 
institutions do not govern in the sense of issuing rules or regulations.  
Instead, their common mandate is to serve as financial intermediaries. 
Though much has been written about World Bank mission creep,111 
the essential nature of the Bank has not changed since its creation.  While 
the reasons the Bank’s members created it and continue to support it are 
deeply embedded in their foreign affairs agendas and vary over time, the 
specifics of the mandate within which the institution operates does not.  
The Bank is a financial institution, in essence a purveyor of loans and 
guarantees.112  Its Articles of Agreement lay out the institution’s 
financing mandate with considerable specificity.113 
                                                                                                                       
clear that these terms and conditions amount to governance.  True, Bank loans are contracts of 
adhesion for all but its most powerful borrowers.  See WOODS, supra note 60, at 70–72; Christine 
Cassar, Can Recipient Countries Really Say No to Conditional Aid?, WORLD BANK  
(Oct. 7, 2009, 7:19 AM), http://blogs.worldbank.org/youthink/can-recipient-countries-really-say-no-
conditional-aid.  Further, conditionality, especially in development policy lending where the Bank 
may prescribe sweeping governmental reforms, has the appearance of the Bank imposing its 
judgment on the borrowing country where the country is desperate for funds and in no position to 
negotiate.  But to view such loans as governance ignores the fact that the loan is, however 
desperately needed, voluntarily assumed.  At bottom, an international development institution’s 
authority to set terms and conditions is contractually based.  It is not broadly consensual, arising 
from a multilateral treaty; it is specifically consensual, arising from a loan or grant agreement 
entered into on a one-on-one basis between the institution and the borrower or recipient.   
  However, “governance can vary widely in its coerciveness,” ranging from hard power to 
soft power; “non-binding regimes lack coercive power, [but] they still [can] be said to ‘rule’ to the 
extent that they intend their decisions to guide others.”  Bodansky, supra note 16, at 5–6.  “[S]oft 
power ‘co-opts people rather than coerces them.’”  Hlavac, supra note 57, at 207 (quoting JOSEPH S. 
NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO 
IT ALONE 9 (2002)).  In response to the observation that “harmonization among national laws . . . 
frequently results from World Bank activity,” id. (citing Andre Rigo, Address at the University of 
Ottawa Conference on Globalization and the Evolution of Legal Systems: Law Harmonization 
Resulting from the Policies of International Financial Institutions: The Case of the World Bank (Oct. 
2000)), some scholars take the view that the Bank’s lending practices amount to a form of soft law.  
See id. (citing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 179 (2004)).  Others maintain that 
the Bank’s lending activities amount to governance because they cumulatively have the effect of 
norm diffusion.  See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 76, at 714 (noting the Bank’s power in 
defining development and norms and transmitting such information to developing countries (citing 
Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian 
Miracle in Political Perspective, NEW LEFT REV., May–June 1996, at 3)). 
 110.  See, e.g., IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 109, art. III; GEF Instrument, supra note 
109, para. 9; GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 109, § III. 
 111.  See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, International Law and the Operations of the International 
Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 
15–16 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (summarizing scholarly criticism of 
mission creep); Bruce Rich, The World Bank Under James Wolfensohn, in REINVENTING THE 
WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 26, 37 (noting that “[t]he Bank under [James] Wolfensohn at times 
appeared to be trying to be all things to all people”). 
 112.  See WORLD BANK INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 12, at 12–18, 129–20 (describing 
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Loans and guarantees are to be made for productive purposes, for 
specific projects,114 and only to member countries who cannot borrow 
from other sources on reasonable terms.115  Further, the Bank’s Articles 
of Agreement are specific about the conservative nature of the financing 
policies they want the Bank to observe.  For example, they specify that 
the guarantees and loans provided by the Bank must not exceed its 
“unimpaired subscribed capital, reserves and surplus.”116  The specifics 
of the Bank’s mandate serve a clear purpose.  The Bank generates its 
operating capital by issuing bonds on international capital markets.117  
The Bank’s member countries guarantee its payment of principal and 
interest on those bonds.118  Accordingly, the specificity of the Bank’s 
operational mandate is aimed at setting out its purposes while 
simultaneously limiting the scope of its nonborrowing member countries’ 
financial exposure to investors in Bank bonds. 
Newer, sector-specific institutions like the GEF and the Global Fund 
have narrower mandates.  The GEF, for example, helps developing 
country signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention on 
Biodiversity (the Convention on Biodiversity) meet the expense of 
complying with their commitments under those conventions.119  
Comprised of 182 member governments, the GEF is a multibillion dollar 
fund that helps to finance projects in developing counties that contribute 
to environmental protection in six focal areas: “biodiversity, climate 
change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and 
persistent organic pollutants.”120  The terms of the conventions for which 
                                                                                                                       
the Bank’s lending activities and the types of guarantees it offers).  Although the Bank engages in 
other activities, such as administering trust funds and providing investment management services to 
developing countries, it is primarily a lending institution.  Id. at 20–21. 
 113.  See IBRD, Articles of Agreement, supra note 109, art. I. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. art. III, § 4(ii). 
 116.  Id. art. III, § 3. 
 117.  See WORLD BANK INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 12, at 26–29 (listing and 
explaining various securities issued by the Bank). 
 118.  See id. at 25 (detailing the extent of IBRD’s callable capital). 
 119.  See Sophie Smyth, A Practical Guide to Creating a Collective Financing Effort to Save the 
World: The Global Environment Facility Experience, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 29, 32, 36–37 
(2009).  Since its creation, the GEF has also become a source of financing to developing countries to 
help meet the costs of their compliance with the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.  Conventions, GLOBAL 
ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/structure-conventions (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 120.  What is the GEF, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
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the GEF serves as a financing mechanism dictate the broad parameters of 
the financial assistance it provides.121 
The Global Fund’s mandate is focused on the eradication of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.122  It emerged from the July 23, 
2000 commitment of the leaders of the 26th G8 Summit to “implement 
an ambitious plan” to address these diseases.123  Like the GEF, the 
Global Fund is a multibillion dollar fund.124  It finances a wide range of 
activities in developing countries aimed at these diseases, including 
preventing their spread, treating people who are ill, and providing care 
and support for affected people and communities.125 
Implementing an international development institution’s mandate, 
therefore, primarily consists of setting the specific terms and conditions 
on which the institution will provide financing to a borrowing or 
recipient country within the parameters of the institution’s overall 
purposes.  Whether an institution’s mandate is broad or specialized, the 
terms and conditions it imposes on a borrowing or recipient country will 
have a significant impact on that country’s citizens.  In many cases, that 
impact will be as significant as the impact of that country’s legislation.126 
Neither the impact of an international development institution’s 
activities, however, nor its effectiveness in correctly calibrating its terms 
and conditions so as to achieve its purposes, changes the bottom line on 
                                                          
 121.  GEF Instrument, supra note 109, paras. 9(a), 27. 
 122.  GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 109, § II. 
 123.  G8, G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000, para. 19 (July 23, 2000), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ 
summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm.  The idea of creating a special purpose fund took shape during a 
special summit of the Organization of African Unity.  See African Summit on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases, Abuja, Nigeria, Apr. 24–27, 2001, Abuja 
Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Related Infectious Diseases, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. 
OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3 (Apr. 27, 2001), http://www.un.org/ga/aids/pdf/abuja_declaration.pdf.  At that 
meeting, participants pledged to “support the creation of a Global AIDS Fund capitalized by the 
donor community to the tune of US $5–10 billion accessible to all affected countries to enhance 
operationalization of Action Plans, including accessing Anti-retroviral programmes . . . .”  Id.  Also 
at that meeting, African leaders rallied behind the proposal of then-UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan for “the creation of a Global Fund, dedicated to the battle against HIV/AIDS and other 
infectious diseases.”  Annan Press Release, supra note 15.  The UN General Assembly announced 
“[s]upport [for] the establishment . . . of a global HIV/AIDS and health fund to finance an urgent and 
expanded response to the epidemic” at the conclusion of the UN General Assembly Special Session 
in June 2001 and welcomed pledges from donor nations and the private sector.  G.A. Res. S-26/2, 
supra note 15, ¶ 90. 
 124.  See Who We Are, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/whoweare/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 125.  Our Activities, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/activities/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 126.  See STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 43–44 (noting that some agreements between the IMF and 
recipient countries even “stipulated what laws the country’s Parliament would have to pass”). 
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these institutions’ legitimacy.  The institution’s normative legitimacy is 
assured as long as the terms and conditions it imposes are: (a) related to 
advancing the purposes for which it has been created, and (b) follow 
whatever requirements and procedures are prescribed in its mandate.127  
For these reasons, NGO participation in an international development 
institution’s governance will be critical to that institution’s legitimacy 
only if the institution’s express or implied mandate (which may evolve as 
an institution evolves) requires it. 
E. Efficacy and NGOs 
The members of international development institutions generally 
keep the institutions on a short leash. They retain key decision-making 
authority for themselves rather than delegating it to institutional 
management.  This tendency is evident in both established institutions 
like the World Bank and in newer institutions like the GEF.  In both 
cases, member governments retain considerable power to make all 
significant decisions, ranging from decisions on overall strategy to 
specific loan approvals and grant allocations.  They do not surrender 
power over these decisions to institutional management.  Moreover, they 
do not necessarily share power equally among themselves or with others. 
In the governance structure of the Bank, for example, the Board of 
Executive Directors, comprised of member government 
                                                          
 127.  See supra Part II.C.  An institution’s legitimacy can, however, be impugned if it fails to 
comply with its mandate.  See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 423.  Further, that mandate 
can change over time.  See Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: 
The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 553, 557 (1994) (noting that the 
scope of the Bank’s general mandate changes under each leader).  For example, when the World 
Bank established certain procedures and then routinely failed to observe them, see id. at 563 
(discussing the Bank’s violations of internal rules and procedures relating to a development project 
in India), action which ultimately prompted the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, Int’l 
Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. & Int’l Dev. Ass’n, “The World Bank Inspection Panel”, Res. No. 
IBRD 93-10, Res. No. IDA 93-6 (Sept. 22, 1993), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf, it was acting illegitimately.  Once 
approved and adopted, those safeguards became a part of its mandate.  Note, the World Bank 
Inspection Panel was created in response to the findings of the Morse Commission and private sector 
criticism.  INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., THE WORLD BANK, ACCOUNTABILITY AT 
THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON 2 (2003), http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/TenYear8_07.pdf.  The Morse Commission 
was an independent review of the Bank commissioned to investigate allegations made by a broad 
grassroots campaign that Bank policies were violated in the Bank-financed project to fund the Sardar 
Sarovar dam and canal on the Narmada River in India.  Id.  When the Commission validated the 
allegations, finding that the violations had had “devastating human and environmental 
consequences,” the Bank created the Inspection Panel to quell international pressure for greater 
public accountability in Bank lending.  Id. at 2–3. 
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representatives,128 is the locus of power.129  All Bank operational policies 
and loans are approved by the Board, a standing body that meets twice a 
week.130  Further, the Board operates pursuant to a weighted voting 
system according to which the largest Bank shareholders hold the largest 
number of votes.131  This weighted voting system allows the most 
powerful and largest contributors to have the largest say,132 reflecting 
what I call the “paymaster principle.”  UNDP, too, is governed by a 
thirty-six member executive board made up of member country 
representatives.133  The UNDP Executive Board reaches decisions 
through consensus.134 
Member countries also hold the reins in the GEF, with the largest 
contributors having the biggest say.  A secretariat manages the GEF’s 
day-to-day operations.135  The GEF’s locus of power, however, is the 
GEF Council, the body that sets the GEF work program and decides 
                                                          
 128.  Mallaby, supra note 39, at 83. 
 129.  See Ngaire Woods, The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank 
Themselves, 28 WORLD DEV. 823, 831–32 (2000) [hereinafter Woods, The Challenge] (describing 
the powers and roles of the Board).  The Bank is made up of a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Executive Directors (the Board of EDs), and a President and staff who answer to the Board of EDs.  
IBRD, THE WORLD BANK, ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WORLD BANK (July 1, 2012), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf. On most matters, the Board 
of EDs operates by a “consensus, and voting is very rare.” Ngaire Woods, Holding 
Intergovernmental Institutions to Account, 17 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 69, 76–77 (2003) [hereinafter 
Woods, Intergovernmental Institutions].  All member countries of the Bank are represented on the 
Board of EDs but they do not have an equal amount of power or votes.  See THE WORLD BANK, 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT SUBSCRIPTIONS AND VOTING 
POWER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://sitesources.worldbank.org/BODINT/ 
Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf. Countries may become members 
of the Bank if they are members of the IMF.  Boards of Directors: Voting Powers, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUC10 (last updated July 6, 2012).  The amount of shares each 
country has in the Bank is determined by the size of its economy at the time when it becomes a 
member.  See WORLD BANK INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 12, at 53.  The number of votes 
each Executive Director has, however, is determined according to the number of shares held by the 
country or countries that she represents.  This system of voting is known as a weighted voting 
system.  See Woods, The Challenge, supra, at 828. 
 130.  Boards of Directors: Executive Directors, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/ 
1UZ5779V10 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 131.  See Woods, The Challenge, supra note 129, at 828. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Executive Board, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/ 
en/home/operations/executive_board/overview.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 134.  Decisions of the Executive Board, supra note 107. 
 135.  See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 21, at 1289–90.  The Secretariat is headed by a 
Chief Executive Officer, selected by the GEF Council.  Id. para. 21, at 1289.  The Secretariat’s 
responsibilities include implementing Council decisions, commissioning reports and reviews 
requested by the GEF Council, and handling the logistics of meetings.  Id. para. 21, at 1289–90. 
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grant by grant how the GEF’s resources will be spent.136  The GEF 
Council includes thirty-two member countries and operates by 
consensus.137  The GEF’s founding charter, however, includes a 
mechanism for a formal vote if consensus is unreachable.138  That 
mechanism provides for double weighted voting, i.e., “an affirmative 
vote representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of 
participants and a 60 percent majority of the total contributors.”139  The 
GEF conveys its financing to developing countries through a range of 
intermediary and sub intermediary agencies, known under the GEF 
Instrument as “Implementing and . . . executing Agencies.”140  Only 
implementing agencies and executing agencies can submit project 
proposals for GEF Council approval.141 
                                                          
 136.  See id. para. 15, at 1287, para. 20, at 1288.  An exception to the need for GEF Council 
grant approval applies to project preparation grants given to multilateral development banks that are 
approved by the Chief Executing Officer (CEO) of the GEF Secretariat.  See Smyth, supra note 119, 
at 58.  In addition to deciding on the GEF work program, the Council “monitor[s] the ongoing work 
program, review[s] the degree to which GEF activities conform to the priorities and policies of the 
relevant Conference of the Parties, oversee[s] the work of the Secretariat, review[s] and approv[es] 
the . . . annual budget, and evaluat[es] GEF operational strategies, policies and programs.”  Id. at 42 
n.54 (citing David Freestone, The Establishment, Role and Evolution of the Global Environment 
Facility: Operationalising Common but Differentiated Responsibility?, in LAW OF THE SEA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. 
MENSAH 1077, 1091 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007)).  The Council meets 
twice a year and more frequently as needed.  GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 17, at 1288.  
Meetings are co-chaired by the CEO and a chair elected from among Council members for that 
purpose.  Id. para. 18, at 1288. 
 137.  GEF Council, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/council (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2012).  Of the GEF Council’s thirty-two member countries, sixteen come from developing 
countries, fourteen come from developed countries, and two come from countries in “central and 
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.”  GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 16, at 1287–
88.  The major contributors to the facility—France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—hold individual chairs on the Council.  See Constituencies, Council Members and 
Alternates, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/Council_Members_Alternates (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2012).  Other Council chairs represent constituencies of a number of members.  See 
id.   
 138.  Freestone, supra note 136, at 1090 (citing GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 25(c), at 
1291).   
 139.  GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 25(c)(i), at 1291. 
 140.  See id. annex B, para. 4(b), at 1295.  The GEF Instrument identifies the World Bank, 
UNDP, and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as implementing agencies.  Id. 
para. 22, at 1290.  Over the last several years, several entities, including all four of the regional 
multilateral development banks and a number of UN entities, have been approved to serve as 
executing agencies.  GEF Executing Agencies, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG., http://www 
.unido.org/index.php?id=039564 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  Proposals for the GEF Council to 
make direct grants to beneficiary countries are currently under review.  See Direct Access for 
Enabling Activities (NPFE & Convention Reports), GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef 
.org/gef/EA_direct_access (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 141.  See Freestone, supra note 136, at 1097 (explaining GEF’s “double approval system”).  
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Member countries therefore exercise an active, ongoing role in 
shaping the strategy and priorities of international development 
institutions and in allocating those institutions’ resources.  Their 
delegation of power to institutional management is limited.  In the face 
of this tendency, member states’ mandate to include NGOs must be 
explicit.  There is no basis on which to infer an implied mandate to these 
institutions to include NGOs in decision-making.  As many scholars have 
noted, states create international institutions to serve their interests.142  
The founding members’ interests also determine such institutions’ 
design.143  States’ views of their interests and therefore of the purposes 
they want an institution to serve can change over time.144  Given these 
realities, the member states of international development institutions are 
likely to mandate NGO participation in institutional governance if and 
when they view such participation as necessary to the advancement of 
their institutional goals. 
F. Efficacy v. Credibility 
Therefore, the question raised by NGOs’ pressure for NGO 
participation in the Green Climate Fund’s governance145 and by 
observations of policy makers such as World Bank President Robert 
Zoellick and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that NGO 
participation in institutional governance is critical to legitimacy,146 is not 
an issue of legitimacy.  As Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane point 
out, the implications of determining that an institution is illegitimate are 
                                                                                                                       
When the restructured GEF was first established, only the implementing agencies could submit 
project proposals for GEF Council approval.  See Smyth, supra note 119, at 57.  Executing agents, 
interested in securing GEF financing, had to submit their proposals through an implementing 
agency.  See id.  This process changed over time and executing agencies now enjoy equivalent status 
to implementing agencies.  See id. at 60. 
 142.  See, e.g., Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 76, at 704 (noting that many scholars “treat 
[international organizations] as creations of states designed to further state interests”).   
 143.  See Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 6, at 2 (positing that states construct and 
shape institutions to advance their goals). 
 144.  See id. at 7 (stating that “institutional evolution . . . involves deliberate choices [by 
members] made in response to changing conditions”). 
 145.  See SIERRA, supra note 10, at 3. 
 146.  See Zoellick, supra note 14, at 381 (“Modern multilateralism will not be a constricted club 
with more left outside the room than seated within.  It will look more like the global sprawl of the 
Internet, interconnecting more and more countries, companies, individuals, and NGOs through a 
flexible network.  Legitimate and effective multilateral institutions, backed by resources and capable 
of delivering results, can form an interconnecting tissue, reaching across the skeletal architecture of 
this dynamic, multi-polar system.”); Annan Press Release, supra note 15. 
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significant.147  If an institution lacks legitimacy, “then [its] claims to 
authority [are] unfounded and [it is] not entitled to our support.”148  In 
contrast, if an institution is legitimate but flawed, “the appropriate 
objective is to reform it, rather than to reject it outright.”149  As long as 
international development institutions operate within their member-
imposed mandates, they will be legitimate whether or not they include 
NGOs in governance.  The question, rather, is whether these institutions’ 
member states should mandate NGO participation in institutional 
governance so as to make these institutions more credible and apparently 
worthy of our support.  I address this question in Part III below. 
III. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND NGOS 
Those who advocate for the necessity of NGO participation in 
institutional governance maintain that NGO participation makes a 
development institution more credible because it enables the institution 
to be more effective.  A firm showing of the impact of NGO participation 
in governance on an institution’s credibility, effectiveness, or both would 
require empirical research that has not been done.  Meanwhile, however, 
questions about the role to afford NGOs in new institutions, such as the 
Green Climate Fund, need an answer.  Further, the need for change in 
institutions like the World Bank, where NGOs currently have little 
formal role, demands attention.  For guidance on what should be done, 
we must draw on the views of scholars on the potential of NGOs to 
contribute to international institutions generally and on the lessons to be 
gleaned from case studies of recent practice in international 
development. 
A. The Inclusion v. Exclusion Debate 
Proponents of NGO participation in international institutions 
(inclusionists) maintain that NGOs ameliorate the pathologies of 
international institutions.150  They identify these pathologies as aloofness 
                                                          
 147.  Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 407. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 894 (“[T]he value-added from NGOs on the 
international plane is that they correct for the pathologies of governments and [international 
organizations].”); Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 271–74 (noting various aims of NGO participation 
including identifying deviations from policy and evaluating results); Spiro, supra note 1, at 169 
(arguing that inclusion of NGOs in “institutional decisionmaking will . . . advance the system 
 
SMYTH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:02 PM 
2012] NGOS AND LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 407 
from the real needs of real people, a lack of accountability to those 
people and to their member states, and a lack of transparency.151  The 
inclusionists see NGOs as solutions to these problems.  The fact that 
NGOs operate on the ground level among the people most affected by 
international rulemaking gives them a hands-on expertise that most 
international bureaucracies lack.152  The inclusionists also point out that 
NGOs provide a high level of representatives for the issues and the 
unheard voices they serve.153  Unlike government representatives, NGOs 
cannot afford to fall out of touch with their constituents.154  Their very 
existence requires them to convey their constituents’ views both at a 
national and an international level; if they fail to do so, their members 
will leave.155  Government representatives lack the same imperative to be 
responsive to their constituents, as constituents cannot easily relocate.156 
Steve Charnovitz, one of the strongest proponents of inclusion, 
outlines the specific nature of NGOs’ contributions to international 
institutional governance in a comprehensive work tracing NGO 
                                                                                                                       
itself”); Peter Spiro, NGOs and Human Rights: Channels of Power, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 123–28 (Sarah Joseph ed., 2009) (describing types of interaction between 
NGOs and international organizations).  In support of the importance of multi-stakeholder 
participation (including NGOs) in international environmental governance, see Jonas Ebbesson, 
Public Participation and Privatisation in Environmental Matters: An Assessment of the Aarhus 
Convention, 4 ERASMUS L. REV. 71, 88 (2011) (“Public participation matters . . . for the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of environmental governance and decision-making.”); Kal Raustiala & David G. 
Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659, 667–68 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 
1998) (noting NGOs’ crucial role in environmental governance); Winfield J. Wilson, Feature, Legal 
Foundations for NGO Participation in Climate Treaty Negotiations, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y, Winter 2010, at 54.  In support of the importance of NGO participation in global health 
governance, see Jennifer Prah Ruger, Shared Health Governance, AM. J. BIOETHICS, July 2011, at 
32; Devi Sridhar & Lawrence O. Gostin, Reforming the World Health Organization, 305 JAMA 
1585, 1585 (2011) (advocating that the World Health Organization give voice to and engage with 
NGOs). 
 151.  See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 894–95, 902 (listing the benefits of NGO 
participation and noting that the cost to international organizations of allowing in NGOs will be 
increases in disclosure and transparency). 
 152.  See, e.g., id. at 894 (noting how NGOs help recognize problems by “bringing in data and 
expertise”); Spiro, supra note 150, at 124–25 (noting the influence of NGOs and their consultative 
status in various UN bodies); Sridhar & Gostin, supra note 150, at 1585 (implying the World Health 
Organization needs to work directly with communities in the world with health needs). 
 153.  See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 1, at 165 n.10 (discussing NGOs giving minority elements a 
voice). 
 154.  See id. at 164 (discussing how the multiplicity of issues confronted by legislative 
representatives allows them leeway to go against voter wishes). 
 155.  See id. at 165 (contrasting the ease with which members can leave an NGO when 
displeased with the difficulty of exiting a state). 
 156.  See id. at 164–65. 
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participation in international governance from 1775 to the early 1990s.157  
Charnovitz details core functions associated with institutional 
governance that NGOs are well-suited, and in some cases uniquely 
suited, to perform.158  These functions include gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating information, advocating alternatives to decision makers, 
outing institutional failure to abide by their commitments, and serving as 
a catalyst for mobilizing action.159 
As transnational actors, Charnovitz maintains, NGOs can help 
expose to public attention national rivalries serving as stumbling blocks 
to organizational consensus.160  NGOs can also “serve as competitors to 
international and national bureaucrats in [internal institutional] debates,” 
and thereby ameliorate institutional insularity.161  Further, by “bringing 
in data and expertise to show that a problem exists,” they can put 
pressure on institutional actors who might prefer to bury the problem.162  
In addition, NGOs can usually fill in for failed states.163  Their individual 
passions will often cause them to “seek . . . new rules that governments 
might not champion on their own.”164  Given NGOs’ potential to make 
these multiple contributions, Charnovitz concludes that it is illegitimate 
to exclude their voice from international decision-making.165 
                                                          
 157.  Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 189–268. 
 158.  See id. at 271 (citing Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 191, 219, 221–22, 267–69 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael 
Reisman eds., 1981)). 
 159.  See id. at 271–72. 
 160.  See Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 894 (noting that “[s]tates seek to impose costs on other 
states and NGOs can counter such actions” through public exposure and argument). 
 161.  See id. at 895. 
 162.  See id. at 894.  Many NGOs are also viewed as tied in to the communities in which they 
operate.  See PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 41 (1995).  NGOs’ role in supporting communities reflects 
three different styles: blueprint, broker, and process.  Id. at 43 (citing DAVID D. GOW, LOCAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE REAPPRAISAL (1979)).  “The 
blueprint, adaptable to local conditions, offers an outline of technical or social changes—an 
irrigation system, latrines, etc.—that the NGO facilitates.”  Id.  Broker NGOs serve as 
“intermediar[ies] between a community and regional or national government or an aid donor.”  Id.  
They help “the community develop plans and strategies to secure . . . [what] the community wants.”  
Id.  A process style NGO, on the other hand, “focuses initially not on providing services or brokering 
relationships, but on facilitating a community’s agreeing to goals and objectives, and to strategies for 
achieving them.”  Id. at 43–44. 
 163.  See Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 894–95. 
 164.  Id. at 895. 
 165.  See id. at 909–10. 
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The potential contributions Charnovitz identifies are precisely the 
kind of functions NGOs perform in international development.166  The 
World Bank has acknowledged as much.167  Accordingly, Bank staff are 
encouraged to seek input from NGOs with expertise when formulating 
“policies, strategies, procedures, and major reports.”168  NGOs also 
monitor and evaluate Bank projects, and the Bank has hailed them as 
“particularly effective in monitoring project impacts on indigenous 
peoples and the environment.”169  In addition, Bank borrowers often 
engage NGOs in implementing projects,170 and a number of Bank grant 
programs include NGOs as eligible recipients.171 
UNDP, likewise, publicly affirms that NGOs play a critical role in its 
work.  It repeatedly refers to NGO participation as critical to the success 
of UNDP’s objectives,172 and as a “duty and not an option for UNDP at 
all levels of its work.”173  NGOs are involved in UNDP intelligence, 
advocacy, prescription, and monitoring functions.174  UNDP engages 
NGOs in country assessments, and its policies exhort “extending 
engagement beyond well-known organizations of civil society to . . . 
grass-roots organizations that are deeply embedded in the creative 
processes of societal change.”175  UNDP also draws upon NGOs in 
translating the results of its annual Human Development Report into 
                                                          
 166.  See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 53 (1997) (noting that NGOs 
“breed new ideas; advocate, protest, and mobilize public support; do legal, scientific, technical, and 
policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, monitor, and enforce . . . commitments; and 
change institutions and norms”); Spar & Dail, supra note 5, at 175 (listing various focuses of 
NGOs). 
 167.  WBGP 14.70, supra note 52, para. 6(a)–(h). 
 168.  Id. para. 11. 
 169.  Id. para. 22. 
 170.  Id. para. 26. 
 171.  Id. para. 23.  For a full account of Bank grant programs, see Sophie Smyth, World Bank 
Grants in a Changed World Order: How Do We Referee This New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
483 (2008). 
 172.  See UNDP Engagement with Civil Society, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/partners/civil_society_organizations.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (describing UNDP’s engagement with civil society as “critical to . . . the 
quality and relevance of official development programmes”); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 
UNDP AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: A PRACTICE NOTE ON ENGAGEMENT para. 1 (2001) 
[hereinafter UNDP ENGAGEMENT NOTE], available at www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/library 
page/democratic-governance/civic_engagement/undp-and-civil-society-organizations-a-policy-of-
engagement-2001.html (stating that “the UNDP focus on sustainable human development that places 
people at the centre of development cannot be achieved without the robust engagement of civil 
society and its organizations”). 
 173.  UNDP ENGAGEMENT NOTE, supra note 172, para. 25. 
 174.  See id. para. 37 (describing how NGOs assist UNDP projects). 
 175.  Id. paras. 37–38. 
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“advocacy strategies and campaigns for effecting policy changes,” and in 
monitoring countries’ progress on the Millennium Development Goals.176 
UNDP’s approach to NGO participation is driven by its commitment 
to the view that development is a human right.177  Its policies reflect an 
intention to establish formal means to listen to individuals in developing 
countries, and it relies on local NGOs to help deliver on that goal.178  
Further, while recognizing its obligations towards governments, UNDP 
also explicitly acknowledges an obligation to respect civil society’s 
rights.179  In maintaining that it bears “duties and obligations towards the 
poor,” UNDP acknowledges that it needs to “engage with and involve a 
range of civic actors” to fulfill those obligations.180 
NGOs are thus deeply involved in international development.  In 
addition, the World Bank and UNDP acknowledge that NGOs are 
indispensable.181  The case for some degree of NGO participation in all 
development institution decision-making is strong.  In fact, however, as 
detailed below, such participation is not the norm.  What then, is the 
reason for their exclusion? 
The case for exclusion has several sources.  The exclusionists come 
in two flavors representing different ends of the critique of Westphalian 
sovereignty.182  At one end are the international realists who deny that 
anyone but sovereign states ought to have a role in international 
affairs.183  Far from seeing NGO participation as enhancing institutions, 
they view such participation as an illegitimate intrusion on 
sovereignty.184  This view of state supremacy gives rise to vehement 
opposition to sovereign states deigning to share decision-making power 
                                                          
 176.  Id. para. 37. 
 177.  See id. at 5 box 2 (noting that exclusion of certain groups from the benefits of development 
is a human rights abuse). 
 178.  See id. para. 23.   
 179.  Id. para. 17. 
 180.  Id. para. 7. 
 181.  See supra notes 167–80 and accompanying text. 
 182.  “Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external 
actors from authority structures within a given territory.”  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: 
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3–4 (1999). 
 183.  See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 41–42 (1998) (noting the 
increasing role of NGOs in international affairs and lamenting NGOs’ transfer of “deliberations from 
the U.S. political system” to outside venues); Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American 
Constitution—Something’s Got to Give, 55 NAT’L INT. 30, 37 (1999) (criticizing international 
institutions interfering with governments and the concept of “global civil society”). 
 184.  See Spiro, supra note 1, at 162 (“Some who question NGO legitimacy would simply wish a 
return to the old world in which states aggregately held most associational power.”). 
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over matters of global governance with nonstate entities such as 
NGOs.185 
At a primal level, the realists’ argument is based on a view of 
international affairs that places the state at the center of world politics.186  
This view holds that world politics is a “two-level game, with domestic 
political preferences as a variable in interstate relations.”187  According to 
this view, states should “remain dominant in the establishment of formal 
international regimes” and NGOs’ role is to apply pressure on states in 
the domestic political sphere.188  States may then, if they so choose, 
represent the NGOs’ viewpoints in the international sphere.189 
At the other end of the exclusionist spectrum is a group that has no 
truck with Westphalian sovereignty.  Instead, their objection to NGO 
participation stems from their view of NGOs as either captive vassals of 
state organizations190 or as unrepresentative special interest groups 
reflecting the desires of a nonrepresentative elite portion of society.191  
We can think of this latter group as the civil society skeptics.  They are 
willing to tear down the barriers of Westphalian sovereignty but do not 
believe NGOs are democratically legitimate.192  This view is often 
summed up in the pithy query, “Who elected the NGOs?”193 
The skeptics’ view is based on a deep distrust of the 
representativeness of NGOs and therefore of their authority to speak on 
                                                          
 185.  See id. 
 186.  See Peter J. Spiro, Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770, 770 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) 
(noting NGOs were marginalized during the Cold War due to state-centric views of international 
decision-making). 
 187.  Id. at 775 (citing Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two 
Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988)). 
 188.  Id. at 776. 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of 
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 91, 112 (2000) (describing the intertwining of states and NGOs).   
 191.  See, e.g., id. at 118 (criticizing the democratic legitimacy of international NGOs that act 
“not [as] conduits from the ‘people’ or the ‘masses’ or the ‘world citizenry’ from the ‘bottom up’,” 
but, rather, as “vehicle[s] for international elites” to pursue their own agendas); Kenneth Anderson, 
“Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and the United 
Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 868 (2011) (noting that civil society is not representative). 
 192.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 190, at 120 (stating that the Ottawa Convention banning 
land mines was a good development, but the NGOs that helped bring it about were not 
democratically legitimate). 
 193.  Id. at 119 (quoting David Rieff, Panel Discussion on Landmines and International Civil 
Society at Washington College of Law, American University (Feb. 25, 1998)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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behalf of ordinary citizens on a par with states.194  Largely, this view is 
based on opposition to a premise that sweeps all NGO participation in 
international institutional decision-making under the too-broad umbrella 
of global governance by a putative global civil society.195  According to 
that view, globalization requires a global government.196  In truth, 
however, supporting NGO participation in the governance of an 
international development institution is several degrees removed from 
embracing the idea of a global government exerting global lawmaking 
authority.197 
Opposition to including NGOs in institutional decision-making also 
stems from the paymaster principle.  Donor states that contribute the 
largest amounts to international development institutions want the largest 
say in those institutions’ decisions and are reluctant to share control of 
their contributed resources with states that contribute less.198  In the same 
vein, donor states shy from sharing control over those resources with 
non-contributors, such as NGOs, that generally do not donate 
resources.199 
                                                          
 194.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 191, at 868 (noting that a ballot box is an intermediary 
between citizens and the government and no such analogue exists between citizens and NGOs); Ruth 
W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 29, 38 (2005) (noting that because “NGOs are typically the result of entrepreneurial 
initiatives by activists[,] . . . they do not result from a process of delegation”).  Note, opponents of 
the view that NGOs should be excluded from global governance do not dispute that exclusionists 
make some valid claims.  See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 1, at 162 (“Wherever power is exercised, 
questions of accountability are appropriately posed.” (citing Peter J. Spiro, New Global 
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions, 
WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45; Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental 
Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996))).  They argue, 
however, that inclusion with safeguards is a more informed and fruitful way to address valid 
concerns about representativeness.  See, e.g., id. (arguing that “[f]ormal NGO participation in 
international decisionmaking would have the effect of outing NGO power” and holding NGOs 
accountable). 
 195.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 191, at 845 (discussing NGO participation in the context of 
an overarching question on the feasibility and desirability of “global governance”). 
 196.  See Bodanksy, supra note 17, at 623 (noting that globalization has strained the system and 
international governance is needed to address environmental problems that individual states cannot). 
 197.  See Anderson & Rieff, supra note 1, at 26 (challenging the idea of global civil society and 
offering alternate ways of understanding NGOs, including as an analogue to earlier missionary 
movements).  Anderson and Rieff concede, however, that international NGOs’ original claim to a 
right to be respectfully heard by those engaged in international planning and execution of policy 
commands respect.  Id. at 35.  For proponents of the idea of a global government, see, for example, 
DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO 
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 273–74 (1995) (advocating the idea of a global government through 
the establishment of a directly elected “independent assembly of democratic peoples”). 
 198.  See supra Part II.E. 
 199.  See supra Part II.E. 
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Additionally, at a purely pragmatic level, inclusiveness is time-
consuming and expensive.200  Even when individual member countries 
support inclusion, institutional opposition is predictable.201  NGO 
participation makes life difficult for an institution and disrupts the cozy 
internal status quo.202  NGO participation is likely to cause pressure to 
make policy changes, increase disclosure and transparency needs, and 
cabin institutional discretion.203  Moreover, the costs of providing 
processes to allow for NGO participation are likely considerable.204  For 
all of these reasons, the concept of NGO participation meets resistance 
and generates fear and aversion in governments and international 
institutions, including international development institutions.  Whether 
and to what degree NGOs are allowed to participate in governance 
becomes a push and pull of these competing interests. 
B. Lessons From the Field 
As indicated above, states’ views on whether NGO participation in 
the governance of international development institutions advances the 
states’ interests will vary across institutions and over time.205  In the 
creation of sector-specific institutions like the GEF and the Global Fund, 
states have veered towards inclusion.  That tendency counters the 
tendency towards exclusion that preceded it and that still applies to the 
World Bank and the UN.206  The contrast between states’ practice in 
these two categories of development institutions prompts consideration 
of the reasons why these different generations and types of international 
                                                          
 200.  See Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 902 (noting a cost of allowing NGO participation to 
international organizations is increased disclosure and transparency (citing Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, Changing Roles of International Organizations: Global Administrative Law and the 
Interplay of Legitimacies, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 655, 660 (2009))). 
 201.  See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 230 (noting that some intergovernmental 
organizations have continually ignored NGOs’ demands to participate); Brakman Reiser & Kelly, 
supra note 33, at 1071–73 (discussing costs of “accreditation, monitoring, and enforcement 
mechanisms”). 
 202.  See Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 902–03 (describing ways an NGO might agitate for 
internal change). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Brakman Reiser & Kelly, supra note 33, at 1071–72 (noting that the costs of establishing 
and implementing procedures for allowing NGO participation can be considerable and suggesting 
ways of reducing these costs). 
 205.  See supra Part II.E. 
 206.  See Gartner, supra note 22, at 599 (noting that states formerly managed governance of 
international institutions to the exclusion of nongovernmental entities). 
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development institutions persist with different norms, and of how or 
whether the difference might affect their respective credibility. 
1. The Inclusion Norm 
Starting in the early 1990s, NGOs adopted a new approach to 
securing increased participation in international development.  Instead of 
limiting themselves to advocating for a greater role in established 
institutions like the World Bank and the UN, they urged donor states to 
pursue international development through alternative channels: 
specialized funds dedicated to providing development assistance in 
specific, narrowly defined sectors.207  I refer to these funds as “special 
purpose funds.”  The GEF, Global Fund, and the Green Climate Fund are 
prime examples. 
NGOs pressed for the special purpose fund approach because it 
offers new opportunities for NGOs.  Each fund is a tabula rasa with a 
governance structure that donors can design and customize to meet their 
needs.208  The newness of a fund’s structure allows for more flexibility 
than a preexisting institution with a long history of doing business as a 
government-only club.209  This newness and flexibility opens the door for 
NGOs to press for a governance structure that incorporates them.  Not 
surprisingly, these funds have a strong norm of inclusion. 
The special purpose fund phenomenon and the attendant norm of 
inclusion began with the creation of the GEF in 1994.210  The norm of 
inclusion reached new heights with the creation of the Global Fund in 
2002.211  Both of these funds include NGOs in governance to a degree 
                                                          
 207.  See, e.g., Charlotte Streck, The Global Environment Facility—A Role Model for 
International Governance?, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2001, at 71, 86 (“NGOs played a strong and 
important role during the foundation of the GEF.”); Sonja Bartsch, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria: Establishment, Current Issues and Future Challenges 4–5 (2005) (paper 
presented at the Salzburg Seminar on the Governance of Health (Dec. 5–8, 2005)), available at 
http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/Salzburg/Bartsch_Global_Fund.pdf (noting how a “strong 
coalition of NGOs” with health-related focuses pushed for the Global Fund as well as for 
participation in its governance). 
 208.  See, e.g., Bartsch, supra note 207, at 5 (discussing how NGOs were successful in 
influencing the governance structure of the Global Fund, securing rights to consult as well as 
decision-making power).  As David Gartner has noted, if an institution is not designed to be 
inclusive of NGOs, “opportunities for transformation of governance . . . may be quite limited.”  
Gartner, supra note 22, at 639. 
 209.  See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 235–37 (describing NGOs’ efforts to influence 
and gain access to institutions including the World Bank, IMF, and the World Trade Organization). 
 210.  What is the GEF, supra note 120 (discussing the history of the GEF). 
 211.  Who We Are, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, 
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that was unprecedented before their creation.212  As precedents, they 
offer two competing models for NGO participation in governance.  For 
ease of reference, I label these competing models the “active observer” 
model (which emerged and evolved in the GEF) and “the coequal 
decision-maker model” (which emerged in the Global Fund). 
a. NGOs As Active Observers 
The active observer model emerged from the GEF, which was 
partially the brainchild of international environmental NGOs.213  The 
GEF’s creation was a path-breaking triumph for NGO activism.214  One 
of the first initiatives the GEF Council undertook was to formalize a 
process of consulting with NGOs.  In its second meeting, the GEF 
Council decided that ten NGOs should be allowed to participate at each 
Council meeting, five as “attendees” and five as “observers.”215  
Attendees would be present at Council meetings and have the right to 
participate in discussions before the Council but not discussions in 
executive session—which primarily concerned the GEF’s administrative 
budget and amendments to its rules of procedure.216  Observers would 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/whoweare/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (discussing the 
history of the Global Fund). 
 212.  See NATA DUVVURY ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, PARTICIPATION OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT 
HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 9 (2005), http://www.icrw.org/publications/Participation-
Civil-Society-Global-Governance-Lessons-Learned-from-the-Global-Fund-to-Fight-HIV-AIDS-
Tuberculosis-and-Malaria.pdf (describing civil society’s participation in governance of the Global 
Fund as “pioneering”); Streck, supra note 207, at 89 (describing the governance model of the GEF 
as “quite unusual”). 
 213.  See Streck, supra note 207, at 75–76 (describing NGOs’ dissatisfaction with the GEF’s 
precursor and their role in restructuring the GEF). 
 214.  See id. at 86 (noting the important role NGOs had in the creation of the GEF and 
thereafter).  The Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity were a hard sell and especially 
unpopular among developing countries that viewed them as unfair impediments to their process of 
industrialization imposed by developed countries that themselves industrialized and became wealthy 
without paying heed to the environment.  See UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 13–14 (2004), 
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years_en.pdf (describing the negotiation 
process for the UNFCCC).  The financing the GEF promised was key to securing developing 
countries’ support.  See id. at 14.  The GEF began in 1991 as a pilot initiative, the Global 
Environment Trust, which was later restructured and renamed the GEF.  Streck, supra note 207, at 
72–76 (outlining the beginnings of the GEF). 
 215.  GEF, Criteria for Selection of NGOs to Attend/Observe Council Meetings and Information 
on NGO Consultations, annex A, GEF/C.3/5 (Feb. 22–24, 1995), http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/ 
thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.C.3.5.pdf [hereinafter Criteria for Selection of NGOs].  
 216.  Id. 
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follow the meeting on closed-circuit television.217  The Council also 
allocated funds to defray the cost of NGOs’ attendance.218  The Council’s 
manifest commitment to NGO engagement was groundbreaking. 
Delivering on the Council’s commitment, however, presented 
challenges.  Providing for the participation of ten NGOs begged the 
question of what NGOs should be so anointed.219  It also generated 
related questions about what criteria should be used to select the 
participating NGOs and who should decide whether the criteria had been 
met.220  Further, as the universe of eligible NGOs far exceeded ten, 
decisions were required on whether the right to participate should rotate 
among them and, if so, how frequently.221 
Over time, the GEF answered these questions, and those answers 
evolved.  From early ad hoc decisions, a highly formalized state-of-the-
art systematic process emerged to regulate the representativeness, 
transparency, and accountability of NGO input in GEF decision-
making.222  The GEF Secretariat initially proposed that it would select 
the NGOs to serve as attendees and observers and also devised selection 
criteria, subject to the Council’s approval.223 
The selection criteria require that the ten NGOs selected to attend 
Council meetings be diverse in the views and geographic areas they 
represent, and be balanced among international, national, and local 
groups.224  Further, the criteria generally give preference to NGOs whose 
organizational perspectives are broad-based.225  The applicable Council 
agenda may justify filling more attendee and observer positions with 
NGOs possessing particularized expertise or perspectives.226  Also 
relevant is the attendance of NGOs at previous Council meetings; 
rotation is encouraged.227 
The task of selecting NGOs was lightened because NGOs interested 
in GEF matters became accustomed to coordinating with each other 
                                                          
 217.  History of the GEF NGO Network, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www.gefngo.org/ 
index.cfm?&menuid=75 (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 218.  Criteria for Selection of NGOs, supra note 215, annex A. 
 219.  See id. para. 2. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See id. para. 12. 
 222.  See History of the GEF NGO Network, supra note 217. 
 223.  See Criteria for Selection of NGOs, supra note 215, paras. 2, 7.  
 224.  Id. paras. 9, 11. 
 225.  Id. para. 11. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
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during the GET, the pilot phase of the GEF.228  These NGOs developed a 
practice of presenting their shared concerns to the GET Participant’s 
Committee a day or two prior to the Participant Committee’s meetings.229  
NGOs carried this tradition over to the restructured GEF.230  The NGO 
community interested in GEF matters formed itself into a GEF-NGO 
Network, seizing the opportunity to attend Council meetings.231  The 
Secretariat drew on the Network to select the NGOs that would attend a 
given Council meeting.232  Network members were invited to apply to the 
GEF Secretariat to be accredited as eligible for one of the ten slots.233  
The Secretariat liberally granted accreditation provided the NGO met 
fairly minimal criteria set by the Secretariat and approved by the 
Council.234  Formal NGO participation in GEF Council meetings thus 
became a fixture of GEF governance early in the GEF’s existence.235 
                                                          
 228.  See History of the GEF NGO Network, supra note 217 (describing NGOs’ activities in the 
GEF pilot phase). 
 229.  David Reed, The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Organizations, 9 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 191, 206 (1993). 
 230.  See History of the GEF NGO Network, supra note 217 (discussing the creation of a more 
formalized NGO consultation process). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Criteria for Selection of NGOs, supra note 215, annex B.  
 234.  See id.  The GEF defines an NGO as a “non-profit organization[] whose mandate, 
experience, expertise and capacity are relevant to the work of the GEF, including: community 
groups; local, national, regional and international organizations, including NGO networks, dedicated 
to preserving the environment or promoting sustainable development; indigenous people’s 
organizations; and academic and research institutions.”  Id. para. 5. 
 235.  This participation has been identified as substantive.  See BLEANEY & SAINT-LAURENT, 
supra note 20, annex 2, at 40.  That NGO participation in Council meetings is actually the last step 
of a continuing GEF–NGO dialogue that takes place before Council meetings may be one reason 
why NGO representation at Council meetings is substantive.  See id.  The GEF Council mandated 
this continuing dialogue when it instituted NGO participation in the Council.  See GEF, Joint 
Summary of the Chairs, GEF Council Meeting, February 22–24, 1995, para. 14, 
GEF/C.3/JointSummary (Feb. 28, 1995), http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/ 
GEF.C.3.JointSummary.pdf [hereinafter Joint Summary of the Chairs 1995] (noting that a majority 
of Council members thought the NGO consultations prior to Council meetings were useful).  The 
Council’s decision was clear that NGO participation in Council meetings would supplement but not 
replace the GEF–NGO consultation process that began during the pilot phase.  The Council 
instructed the Secretariat to continue to convene semiannual NGO consultations in conjunction with 
the Council’s regular meetings.  See id.  Further, the Secretariat suggested there should be one 
regional consultation with NGOs on an annual basis, independent of the Council meetings that could 
rotate among different regions.  Criteria for Selection of NGOs, supra note 215, para. 20. 
  “For NGO representatives, the [GEF] Council meeting is the final of a series of three 
meetings held twice a year over the course of one week.”  BLEANEY & SAINT-LAURENT, supra note 
20, annex 2, at 40.  The GEF-NGO Network now routinely convenes an NGO preparatory meeting 
two days before each Council meeting.  Id.  Exclusively attended by NGOs, the preparatory meeting 
is an entire day “dedicated to preparing NGOs’ views and positions.”  Id. 
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As the GEF grew and the universe of interested NGOs expanded, the 
interaction between the GEF-NGO Network and the GEF became the 
target of criticism.236  In response, the Council decided to delegate the 
NGO accreditation process to NGOs themselves.237  In 2008, it 
terminated the GEF Secretariat’s NGO accreditation powers.238  Instead, 
the Council decided that membership of the GEF-NGO Network should 
be the conduit for accreditation of NGOs to the GEF.239  NGOs 
themselves would select what NGOs would attend Council meetings.240 
Since then, a formal structure for the GEF-NGO Network has 
emerged that is coordinated by a committee designated by the GEF-NGO 
Network, the Coordination Committee, subject to defined rules.241  These 
rules prescribe an extraordinary level of diversity in the NGO 
representatives.242  In June 2010, as part of a campaign to achieve more 
                                                                                                                       
  The meeting is followed by the Council-prescribed GEF-NGO Consultation, which is 
“jointly organized and co-chaired by the Chair of the GEF NGO Network and the GEF Secretariat.”  
Id.  The Council Meeting agenda, which is posted several weeks in advance, drives the Consultation 
agenda.  Id.  Representatives of implementing agencies and executing agencies also attend the NGO 
Consultation, and Council members are also invited.  Id.  “NGOs voice concerns, comment on 
policies and projects and present positions on substantive issues.”  Id. 
 236.  GEF, Review of the Non-Governmental Organization Network of the GEF, paras. 120–29, 
GEF/C.27/Inf.5 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/node/550 (noting problems 
with the NGO Network and the GEF’s model of NGO participation); GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, 
OPS3: PROGRESSING TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS § 6.2.7 (2005), available at www.the 
gef.org/gef/OPS3 (same).  
 237.  See GEF, Joint Summary of the Chairs, GEF Council Meeting, November 11–13, 2008, 
para. 28, GEF/C.34/JOINTSUMMARY (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/ 
files/documents/Joint%20Summary%20of%20the%20Chairs_C.34.pdf.   
 238.  See id. 
 239.  Id.  This decision flowed from the findings of the Secretariat’s review of the accreditation 
process: the process was ineffectively cumbersome, the Secretariat lacked the information needed to 
review accreditation requests, and there was no process for periodically reviewing accreditation 
status.  GEF, Enhancing Civil Society Engagement and Partnership with the GEF, para. 21(a), 
GEF/C.34/9 (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter GEF, Enhancing Civil Society Engagement], available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/node/243. 
 240.  Joint Summary of the Chairs 1995, supra note 235, para. 13. 
 241.  See Roles & TOR of the Coordinating Committee, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www. 
gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid=118&parentid=13 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (describing the 
leadership role of the coordination committee). 
 242.  See GEF-NGO NETWORK REVISED RULES, supra note 49, § 2.2.3, annex 1 (mandating 
election of representatives from sixteen regions encompassing six continents).  The Network’s 
expanded responsibilities came after it worked with the Secretariat to develop a clear governance 
structure with rules and procedures for operation.  See GEF, Enhancing Civil Society Engagement, 
supra note 239, para. 3.  The Network now has 487 members.  Members, GEF-NGO NETWORK, 
http://www.gefngo.org/formmaster.cfm?&action=main&menuid=12 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).  
Current regional focal points (RFPs) include organizations such as the Mauritius Council of Social 
Service (MACOSS) for the Eastern Africa region, the Caribbean Forest Conservation Association 
(CFCA) for the Caribbean region, and the Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN) for the 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia region.  GEF-NGO NETWORK, CURRENT GEF NGO NETWORK 
 
SMYTH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:02 PM 
2012] NGOS AND LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 419 
involvement for NGOs in the GEF, the Network tightened its criteria for 
membership and instituted a rule that membership in the Network expires 
unless it is renewed every three years.243 
NGO demands for a role in GEF governance continue to expand.  
NGOs sought and secured access to the triannual GEF Assembly 
meetings.244  NGO representatives have addressed the Assembly at recent 
meetings.245  Further, the GEF-NGO Network held a Civil Society Forum 
prior to the Assembly Meeting in 2010.246  NGOs have also recently 
secured the right to serve as direct intermediaries of GEF financing.247  
Such eligibility means that NGOs may submit proposals for GEF 
financing to the Council,248 a right reserved until recently to the World 
Bank, the regional development banks, and a list of specified UN 
agencies.249 
                                                                                                                       
REGIONAL FOCAL POINTS (ORGANISATIONS) AND RELATED REPRESENTATIVES (April 2012), 
available at http://www.gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid=34 (follow “For a complete list of the 
Regional Focal Points, please click here” hyperlink).  Each region conducts its own election to 
choose its RFP.  GEF-NGO NETWORK REVISED RULES, supra note 49, § 2.2.3.  The Coordination 
Committee then elects a Central Focal Point.  Id. § 2.2.5.  Examples of U.S. NGOs that are members 
of the Network include: American Forests, the Global Coral Reef Alliance, the Nature Conservancy, 
the National Audubon Society, and the World Wildlife Fund.  Members, supra.   
 243.  GEF-NGO NETWORK REVISED RULES, supra note 49, annex 9, at 34.   
 244.  See Why Be a Network Member?, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www.gefngo.org/index. 
cfm?&menuid=71 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 245.  See Assembly, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/assembly (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2012).  NGO representatives have attended all four of the General Assembly meetings that 
have been held to date.  See GEF, Chair’s Summary of the Fourth GEF Assembly, para. 17, 
GEF/A.4/Summary (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/node/3212; A Brief 
History of the GEF, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www.gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid=66 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012).  
 246.  Civil Society Forum, GEF-NGO NETWORK, http://www.gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid= 
140 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).   
 247.  See Accreditation of GEF Project Agencies, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/agencies_accreditation (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“[N]ew agencies to 
be accredited . . . will be referred to as GEF Project Agencies . . . [and] will [be able] to access 
resources from GEF-managed trust funds directly.”).   
 248.  See GEF Agencies, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_agencies (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (noting that current GEF agencies create project proposals). 
 249.  See Smyth, supra note 37, at 1026; GEF Agencies, supra note 248.  NGOs eligible to serve 
as direct intermediaries will be selected by a GEF Accreditation Panel, a new body appointed to 
accredit a range of entities, including NGOs, to serve as GEF Project Agencies.  See GEF, 
Broadening the GEF Partnership Under Paragraph 28 of the GEF Instrument, paras. 11–12, 
GEF/C.40/09 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.40. 
09_Broadening_the_GEF_Partnership.04_26_11.pdf (describing the accreditation procedure).  
Previously, the only grants NGOs could secure directly from the GEF were small grants (up to a 
maximum of $50,000) under the GEF Small Grants Programme, designed to encourage local 
communities and NGOs to participate in furthering the GEF’s goals.  See Mission and History, GEF 
SMALL GRANTS PROGRAMME, http://www.sgp.undp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=98&Itemid=156 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
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NGOs are now pressing for formal NGO representation in GEF 
replenishment meetings,250 which take place every four years.251  
Inevitably, these meetings become a forum for donors to assert their 
objectives for the GEF.252  NGOs therefore have a strong interest in 
having a voice in this dialogue, where recommendations for future GEF 
policy are formulated and proposed.  To date, NGOs have only had 
observer status at GEF replenishment meetings.253  Their demand for a 
more formalized role, which includes a request for the GEF to “organise 
national and regional consultations on replenishment,”254 similar to the 
consultations held in connection with GEF Council Meetings, has not 
been granted. 
As updated and refined from the original version, the active observer 
model of NGO participation now consists of the following: presence at 
the meetings of the loci of power; the right to participate in issues under 
discussion, exclusive of executive sessions; and pre-meeting meetings 
and continual contact to allow participation to be meaningful.  This 
model has since become a precedent for other initiatives.  It was adopted 
by the creators of the Climate Investment Funds in 2008, which are two 
funds created to finance developing countries’ efforts to combat climate 
change,255 in preparation for international agreement on a global climate 
change strategy for 2012 and beyond.256 
                                                          
 250.  GEF-NGO NETWORK, CIVIL SOCIETY EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FIFTH REPLENISHMENT: 
SUMMARY STATEMENT 2 (June 22, 2009) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY EXPECTATIONS], available at 
http://www.gefngo.org/index.cfm?&menuid=87&parentid=109 (follow “Civil Society Expectations 
for the Fifth Replenishment—Summary Statement 22 June 2009—Doc 44KB” hyperlink). 
 251.  GEF Replenishments, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, http://www.thegef.org/gef/replenishment 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 252.  See id. (noting that attendees negotiate and agree on a GEF programming guide).  
Frequently, individual donors condition their willingness to contribute to replenishment on the 
GEF’s agreeing to pursue that donor’s vision of what the GEF’s agenda should be.  For example, the 
United States conditioned its contribution to the fourth GEF replenishment on the GEF’s adopting a 
Resource Allocation Framework.  See Raymond Clémençon, What Future for the Global 
Environment Facility?, 15 J. ENV’T & DEV. 50, 59 (2006).  Typically, donors will outline policy 
proposals at replenishment meetings that are then compiled and forwarded to the GEF Council for 
approval as part of a replenishment package.  See GEF Replenishments, supra note 251; see also 
Smyth, supra, note 119, at 55 (noting that “policy recommendations would come to dominate the 
[replenishment] negotiations”). 
 253.  GEF, Summary of Negotiations: Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, para. 5, 
GEF/A.4/7 (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/4th_assembly_summary_ 
negotiation. 
 254.  CIVIL SOCIETY EXPECTATIONS, supra note 250, at 2. 
 255.  See History, CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS, http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ 
designprocess (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 256.  Richard G. Lugar & Henry M. Paulson Jr., Op-Ed., Bridging the Gap on Climate Change, 
WASH. POST, July 14, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/13/AR 
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Similar to the role NGOs have gained in the GEF, NGOs participate 
as active observers in the governing bodies of these funds, known as 
Trust Fund Committees (TFCs).257  The NGO representatives to the 
Clean Technology Fund are drawn from a diverse and representative 
group of observers including “NGOs, development and environment 
institutions and ‘think tanks,’ local communities and indigenous peoples 
groups.”258  The Strategic Climate Fund invites four CSO 
representatives, two Indigenous Peoples representatives, two private 
sector representatives, and representatives from the GEF, UNFCCC, 
UNDP, and UNEP.259  Most recently, the creators of the Green Climate 
Fund have selected the active observer model as their model of choice.260 
b. NGOs As Coequal Decision-Makers 
The founders of the Global Fund took the leap that neither the GEF 
nor any other development institution had taken and included NGOs as 
voting members in its governing bodies.  The Fund thereby introduced a 
                                                                                                                       
2008071301723.html; Marianne Lavelle, What’s Behind Bush’s Clean-Technology Fund, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP.: MONEY (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/blogs/beyond-the-
barrel/2008/01/29/whats-behind-bushs-clean-technology-fund.  While one might have expected the 
GEF to step into that role, the United States likely wanted an entity more easily controlled by it and 
other developed countries.  See William Gardner, Note, The Fight for Clean Technology Funds: 
Who Should Control the Future of Low-Carbon Technology in the Developing World?, 18 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 481, 492 (2011) (noting the United States’ influence over the World Bank 
and concluding the Clean Technology Fund’s “procedures do, in fact, favor developed countries”).   
 257.  THE WORLD BANK, STRATEGIC CLIMATE FUND para. 27 (June 3, 2008), http://www. 
climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/Strategic_Climate_Fund_final
.pdf; CTF Observers, CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS, http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/ 
cif/CTF_Observers (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); SCF Observers, CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS, 
http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/SCF_Observers (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); see also 
THE WORLD BANK, THE CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUND para. 30 (June 9, 2008), http://www.climate 
investmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/Clean_Technology_Fund_paper_June
_9_final.pdf (noting other institutions with a mandate to promote investments in clean technology to 
address climate change could be invited to observe).   
 258.  CTF Observers, supra note 257.  For the purpose of observing meetings, the CIF defines 
Civil Society Organizations as “any independent non-profit organization of individuals working 
toward a common objective whose mandate is relevant to the purpose and objectives of the fund 
which is governed by the Trust Fund Committee or Sub-Committee for which observers are being 
selected.”  CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS, GUIDELINES FOR INVITING REPRESENTATIVES OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY TO OBSERVE MEETINGS OF THE CIF TRUST FUND COMMITTEES para. 5 (April 20, 2009), 
http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites.climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/guidelines_for_ini
nviti_reps_of_civil_society_to_cif_tfc_meetings_042009.pdf [hereinafter CIF GUIDELINES].   
 259.  SCF Observers, supra note 257.  CSO representatives here are required to reflect balance 
between status, gender, and geographic representation.  CIF GUIDELINES, supra note 258, para. 7. 
 260.  See Conference of the Parties Dec. 3/CP.17 Annex, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, 
17th Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, ¶ 16, at 60 (Mar. 15, 2012) 
(providing for civil society representation, as observers, in Green Climate Fund Board meetings).   
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coequal decision-maker model for NGO participation.  Like the GEF, the 
Fund has detailed mechanisms to assure the ongoing accountability and 
representativeness of the NGOs included. 
This leap forward in the level of NGO involvement occurred because 
NGOs played a significant role in framing the Global Fund’s governance 
structure from the outset.261  Research showed at the time that prevention 
and treatment of the Fund’s target diseases were most likely to be 
effective with assistance from the local clinic level and not merely from 
the government.262  Accordingly, NGOs pressed the Fund’s donors to 
channel resources to the grassroots level.263  The Global Fund’s founders 
aimed to create an entity that had the capacity to enter into “robust 
collaborations with national and international partners” from both the 
public and private sector.264  The founders determined that the Fund 
should be able to work through local stakeholders rather than more 
traditional conduits such as UN agencies or other multilateral or bilateral 
development partners.265  They concluded that they could best meet these 
goals by establishing the Fund as a nonprofit foundation under Swiss 
law.266 
The Global Fund has both a global-level and a country-level 
governance structure.  Both structures reflect an unprecedented level of 
NGO participation.  As the Fund’s “supreme governing body,” with 
                                                          
 261.  See TECHNICAL SUPPORT SECRETARIAT, THE GLOBAL FUND, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
CONSULTATION 1 (Oct. 8, 2001), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/twg/Board_TWG 
NGOConsultMeetingProposal_Report_en/ (noting the importance of involving “NGOs and Civil 
Society actors . . . in the design of the Fund”). 
 262.  See, e.g., M.A. Mercer et al., The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Global 
Response to AIDS, 3 AIDS CARE 265 (1991) (noting strengths of NGOs as compared to 
governments and recommending measures such as increasing NGO funding). 
 263.  See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, KEY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NGO CONSULTATION MEETING: BRUSSELS 12–13 NOVEMBER 2001, 
at 4 (2001), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/twg/Board_TWGNGO ConsultMeeting 
Recommendations_Report_en/ (stating that NGOs should have direct access to the Fund). 
 264.  The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Report on Legal Status Options 
for the Global Fund, at 2, GF/B4/12 (Jan. 29–31, 2003), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/ 
board/04/BM04_12LegalStatusOptions_Report_en/.  
 265.  See ALEXANDER SHAKOW, GLOBAL FUND–WORLD BANK HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS: 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE STUDY paras. 50, 71 (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event 
%20docs/2.7.06%20HIV/GFWBReportFinalVersion.pdf.   
 266.  See GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS, supra note 54, art. 1; see also The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, Report Of The Governance and Partnership Committee, annex 6, 
at 3–6, GF/B5/7 (June 5–6, 2003), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/05/BM05_07 
GPCReportAnnex6_Annex_en/ (noting the Global Fund’s current status and discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of other legal status options).  As a nonprofit foundation, it operates 
under the supervision of the Swiss Federal Supervisory Board for Foundations.  GLOBAL FUND BY-
LAWS, supra note 54, art. 1. 
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authority to set the Fund’s policies and strategies, and allocate its 
resources,267 the Fund’s Board of Directors is the Global Fund’s locus of 
power at the global level.  It plays a role similar to that of the GEF 
Council, including making final funding decisions.268  NGOs have the 
opportunity to play a substantial role in Board decision-making.  The 
Board has a total of twenty-eight members, twenty of which are voting 
members.269  Of the twenty voting Board members, three are NGO 
representatives,270 seven are representatives of developing countries, 
eight are representatives of donor countries, one is a representative of a 
private foundation, and one is a representative of the for-profit private 
sector.271  Every voting member of the Board has one vote.272 
Like the GEF, the Global Fund mandates that the NGO 
representatives be diverse.273  Board members serve for two years or 
“such other term that the board may determine.”274  The Fund’s bylaws 
also ensure against the dilution of any constituency’s voting power.  
Voting members are divided into two constituencies: one comprised of 
the donor and private representatives and the other comprised of 
                                                          
 267.  GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS, supra note 54, art. 7.4. 
 268.  See id. art. 7.4(iii).  The Board also sets operational guidelines, work plans, and budgets for 
the Secretariat and the Technical Review Panel, and generally exercises all powers required to carry 
out the purposes of the Fund.  See id. art. 7.4. 
 269.  Id. art. 7.1. 
 270.  The Global Fund’s Framework Document refers to “civil society” in addition to using the 
term nongovernmental organization (NGO).  See, e.g., GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, 
supra note 109, § VI (B)(1).  As used in the Framework Document, however, the term “civil 
society” mirrors the term “NGO” as used in this Article.  See Edwige Fortier, THE GLOBAL FUND TO 
FIGHTS AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL FUND 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 3 n.1 [hereinafter 
AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP], available at http://www.google.com (search “the global fund evolving 
partnership”) (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).  The Global Fund uses the UN’s definition of civil society.  
Id.  According to that definition, civil society consists of “associations of citizens (outside their 
families, friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and 
ideologies . . . not includ[ing] profit-making activity (the private sector) or governing (the public 
sector).”  Id. 
 271.  GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS, supra note 54, art. 7.1. The eight nonvoting members are 
comprised of the Board Chair and Vice-Chair, a representative from the World Health Organization, 
a representative from the Global Fund’s trustee, the Global Fund’s Executive Director, a 
representative from the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, a representative from the 
Partners constituency, and a Swiss citizen with “his or her domicile in Switzerland authorized to act 
on behalf of the Global Fund to the extent required by Swiss law.”  Id.  
 272.  Id. 
 273.  See id. (requiring that the Board NGO representatives include someone from a developing 
country, someone from a developed country, and someone living with AIDS or HIV or representing 
a community affected by TB or malaria).  
 274.  Id. art. 7.2. 
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developing country and NGO representatives.275  A two-thirds majority 
vote of each constituency is required to approve any matter put to a 
vote.276 
At the country level, the Fund works through a local governance 
process known as the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), which 
brings together within a single structure all actors working on AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria within a given country.277  It includes 
representatives from government, multilateral and bilateral agencies, 
NGOs, and the private sector.278  NGOs’ inclusion as part of the 
constituency groups gives them a substantial role in Global Fund 
decision-making at the country level.  Each CCM must comprise at least 
40% nongovernment constituencies, of which NGOs are a part.279  The 
CCM is the only entity in a given country that may submit a proposal for 
funding to the Global Fund.280 
At both the global and country level, the Fund employs a 
sophisticated and stringent system for selecting the constituency 
representatives, including NGOs, which participate in its governance, 
and for ensuring their continued accountability.  Each constituency group 
represented on the Board, including the five civil society representatives, 
is selected in accordance with processes agreed upon by their respective 
constituencies.281  The Fund sets guidelines for the processes 
constituencies should follow and what they should look for when 
selecting their Board members.282  At the country level, each CCM 
                                                          
 275.  Id. art. 7.6. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 109, § VI. 
 278.  Id. § VI (B)(1).  
 279.  THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDELINES AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRY COORDINATING MECHANISMS § 4, para. 44 (May 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CCMS], available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ccm/guidelines/. 
 280.  GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 109, § VI (B)(6); see also Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ccm/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 281.  GLOBAL FUND BY-LAWS, supra note 54, art. 7.2. The processes are furnished to the 
Secretariat by the constituency group for reference.  THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, 
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE BOARD AND COMMITTEES § 5.2 
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/core/Board_GlobalFundBoard_ 
OperatingProcedures_en.  The processes may require sector-wide consensus or accept a simple 
majority vote.  See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDELINES 
ON CONSTITUENCY PROCESSES 5, http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/publications/other/Pub 
lication_ConstituencyProcesses_Guidelines_en/ [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUENCY 
PROCESSES] (discussing three case studies where constituencies’ Board members were selected 
different ways). 
 282.  See GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUENCY PROCESSES, supra note 281, at 3–5.  For example, 
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member representing NGOs is required to be selected by their 
constituency in a transparent selection process.283  CCMs must document 
their selection processes.284  They must make their selection criteria 
publicly available to the Global Fund and their constituency.285 
In making its proposal to the Global Fund, the CCM nominates one 
or more entities known as “Principal Recipients” to implement the 
proposal.286  The Global Fund enters into its grant agreements directly 
with the Principal Recipients who are the lead implementers of Global 
Fund grants and are directly responsible to the Fund for the financed 
program.287  The Principal Recipients may make sub-grants to a range of 
sub-recipients.288  Principal Recipients are often government ministries 
but NGOs, along with a range of other entities, are also eligible to serve 
in that role.289 
No other entity has as yet replicated the Global Fund’s processes for 
NGO inclusion. Recently, however, a global fund for primary school 
education in developing countries, the Education For All Fund, 
underwent a restructuring that included, inter alia, adopting a coequal 
decision-making model of NGO participation.290  The restructuring gives 
                                                                                                                       
Fund policies emphasize that a Board member should recognize that her participation is as a 
representative from a wider community, constituency, interest group or sector.  See id. at 4 (noting 
the ability to act as an “ambassador/advocate” is key).  Further, a member is expected to consult 
regularly with her constituency and to seek out feedback.  See id.  Fund Guidelines also provide that 
members of a constituency may select a member to serve as the Board representative for a full two 
years or implement an annual rotation system.  Id. at 8.   
 283.  THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDANCE NOTE: 
CCM REQUIREMENTS req. 5 (June 2011), http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/CCM/CCM_ 
RequirementsGuidance_Note_en/ [hereinafter GUIDANCE NOTE: CCM REQUIREMENTS]. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  GUIDELINES FOR CCMS, supra note 279, § 4, para. 50. 
 286.  THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, OPERATIONAL GUIDE: 
THE KEY TO GLOBAL FUND POLICIES AND PROCESSES 15 (Aug. 2010), http://www.the 
globalfund.org/documents/core/guides/Core_GlobalFundPoliciesAndProcessesOperational_Guide_e
n/.  The proposal is based on the CCM’s review of proposals submitted to it from a diverse range of 
actors.  See id. at 31 (noting that some CCMs issue calls for proposals and build a national proposal 
from there).  It can consist of a request for funds to strengthen a country’s health system.  Id. 
 287.  See Principal and Sub-Recipients, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & 
MALARIA, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/structures/pr/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP, supra note 270, fig. 4 (measuring the performance of 
three types of principal recipients including NGOs).  The Fund contracts local in-country experts as 
Local Fund Agents to assess the capacity of proposed Principal Recipients to assume financial and 
program accountability for Fund grants.  THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND 
MALARIA, FIDUCIARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR GRANT RECIPIENTS para. 11 (July 1, 2003), http://www. 
theglobalfund.org/documents/core/grants/Core_Fiduciary_Arrangements_en/.  Further, once a grant 
has been disbursed, the Local Fund Agent provides ongoing oversight of accountability.  Id. 
 290.  EDUC. FOR ALL-FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2011), http://www. 
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education NGOs a voting role in the varying levels of the fund’s 
decision-making bodies.291  The essential element of the coequal 
decision-maker model is undiluted NGO voting power. 
c. Critique of the Inclusion Norm 
Reviewing both models of the inclusion norm in the light of 
exclusionists’ objections to NGO participation, we see that both forms 
overcome some of the civil society’s skeptics’ concerns about NGO 
participation in governance.292  The detailed policies and procedures the 
GEF and the Global Fund follow for selecting participating NGOs from 
large pools of eligible organizations tackle the problem of 
accountability.293  Both systems for rotating NGO representatives also 
allow for a continual monitoring of representatives’ bona fides.  The 
GEF-NGO Network’s rule requiring active renewal of membership in the 
Network every three years provides an additional safeguard. 
As Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire Kelly point out, the value of 
NGO participation in any institution depends in part on whether the 
institution monitors and enforces the accountability of NGO 
participants.294  Such processes need to provide reassurance that 
participating NGOs are accountable entities when selected and remain 
such throughout their participation.  Professors Brakman Reiser and 
Kelly note that national nonprofit regulatory regimes target three aspects 
of a nonprofit entity to regulate its overall accountability.295  These 
consist of the nonprofit’s “mission, financial, and organizational 
accountability.”296  Brakman Reiser and Kelly argue that the procedures 
international institutions employ in screening and selecting participating 
NGOs should include gatekeeping processes that incorporate these 
criteria.297  The GEF and Global Fund’s processes for selecting and 
                                                                                                                       
globalpartnership.org/media/misc/FastTrackInitiativeAnRptApr13.pdf. 
 291.  See Civil Society Organizations, GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUC., http://www.global 
partnership.org/who-we-are/partners/cso-s/ (last modified June 18, 2012). 
 292.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 293.  See Anderson & Rieff, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that NGOs are not electoral institutions 
and can ignore citizens’ will (citing Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American 
Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371 (2001))). 
 294.  See Brakman Reiser & Kelly, supra note 33, at 1052. 
 295.  See id. at 1029. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  See id. at 1068 (“[Nonstate regulators] creating or revising their accreditation, monitoring, 
and enforcement mechanisms also should tailor them to complement domestic nonprofit regulatory 
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monitoring NGOs offer a working example of how this recommendation 
may be realized. 
These funds’ gatekeeping processes also address concerns about 
conflicts of interest.  These concerns arise when NGOs are eligible to 
submit proposals for funding to the institutions in whose governance they 
seek to participate.298  Conflict of interest concerns are more serious 
when NGOs vote on what gets funded.  These concerns can be managed, 
however, when NGOs have to disclose their work programs and meet 
high standards of transparency.  The funds’ processes also show that 
concerns about numerosity are not insurmountable.  Further, by 
implementing strict diversity criteria, and possessing the tools to achieve 
them, the funds enhance the likelihood that the NGOs that do participate 
will represent the communities the funds’ assistance is directed at and 
thereby fulfill a key objective of NGO inclusion. 
Both models of the inclusion norm, however, have their warts.  
Uncertainty lingers about how much active observers influence decision-
making,299 and about what constituency active observers actually 
represent.300  Further, it is not clear what drives the limits funds impose, 
such as the exclusion of active observers from executive sessions of the 
GEF Council.  These limits may be calculated decisions that the unique 
value-added of NGO participation—field-based and technical 
expertise—is not relevant to the subject matter of executive session 
meetings.  Alternatively, the limits may be prompted by a parsimonious 
application of the old paymaster principle, which undermines the 
principle of inclusion. 
It is difficult to conceive of a more extensive role for NGOs in 
institutional governance than the coequal decision-maker model, 
reflected in the multiple roles NGOs assume at every tier of the Global 
Fund’s structure.  The Global Fund’s creators overcame both the 
ideologies and the concerns that ordinarily cause donors to balk at giving 
NGOs a meaningful vote.  The model does, however, present concerns 
regarding capture.  It is not clear that NGOs can simultaneously serve as 
                                                                                                                       
environments.”). 
 298.  See id. at 1051 (noting how self-dealing can be an inherent problem in NGO participation). 
 299.  See Climate Investment Funds, Review of the Self-Selection Process of Observers to CIF 
Committees and Effectiveness of Participation, annex 1, § II, CTF-SCF/TFC.5/7 (Oct. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/2498 (noting that active observers to 
the CIF committees did not feel they could participate fully and freely). 
 300.  Id. para. 17 (noting confusion on whether observers participated in an individual capacity, 
as a representative of an organization, or as a representative of the whole constituency). 
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watchdogs, as the inclusionists note we need them to do,301 or as an 
effective “transnational civil society channel of accountability,”302 while 
being coequal decision-makers.  Consequently, we are left to hope that 
there will always be others outside the decision-making circle to fill that 
need. 
Notwithstanding the warts and some continued need for fine-tuning, 
both models of the inclusion norm pave the way for a very different 
framework for international development assistance than the exclusion 
norm.  Ideally, the choices of which model of inclusion to use and what 
limits to apply will be governed by what is necessary to maximize the 
contribution of NGO participation.  The very existence of both models, 
however, challenges the rationale for other institutions’ continued 
adherence to the exclusion norm. 
2. The Exclusion Norm 
The level of NGO inclusion in the GEF, Global Fund, and now the 
Green Climate Fund, stands in marked contrast to the norm in older 
institutions.  Despite the World Bank and UNDP’s extensive rhetoric of 
inclusion,303 they both impose glass ceilings on NGOs’ roles.  Although 
significant changes in the direction of inclusion have occurred in these 
institutions since the 1990s, the push and pull of the inclusion–exclusion 
debate still favors exclusion at the governance level. 
a. Origin and Evolution 
In the case of UNDP, giving NGOs some voice was always a part of 
the UN’s idea of itself, as provided for in Article 71 of the UN Charter.304  
But the arrangements ECOSOC recommended to the UN General 
                                                          
 301.  See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 1, at 894 (stating that NGOs can “correct for the 
pathologies of . . . [international organizations]”). 
 302.  Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 62, at 432 (emphasis omitted). 
 303.  See Civil Society: The World Bank and Civil Society, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank. 
org/ZEL7JBJM90 (last updated Sept. 25, 2012); UNDP Engagement with Civil Society, supra note 
172. 
 304.  See U.N. Charter, art. 71.  As Steve Charnovitz points out, given the history of close 
government–nongovernment interaction in the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in which 
NGOs were engaged in many committees and conferences, Article 71’s limitation to ECOSOC and 
consultation was not necessarily progress for NGOs.  Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 250.  Indeed, 
Charnovitz quotes one commentator as noting that Article 71 is a “so-far-and-no-further” provision.  
Id. (quoting BERTRAM PICKARD, THE GREATER UNITED NATIONS 72 (1956)).  NGOs actually 
assisted in the drafting of Article 71.  Id. at 249. 
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Assembly to implement Article 71 after the Charter went into force only 
touched on NGO participation in the form of consultation.305  ECOSOC 
confines NGOs to certain activities including attending ECOSOC 
conferences and making statements there, but it does not allow NGO 
participation in governance.306  The World Bank, on the other hand, 
made no formal effort to secure NGO input in its work until the early 
1980s and even then it only took baby steps.307  In 1981, it developed a 
policy for including NGO input in “all stages of project processing—
identification, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation”308 
and in 1984 it created an NGO–World Bank Committee to engage with 
NGO leaders.309 
The attitude of the UN and the Bank toward NGOs changed 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The Cold War and the Westphalian 
system marginalized NGOs.310  Globalization, by contrast, centered them 
as key international actors.311  Faced with this soaring rise in the power 
and clout of NGOs, the UN and the Bank reached out to NGOs, partly 
actualizing what Professor Peter Spiro has dubbed the “paradox of 
inclusion.”312 
The UN’s outreach to NGOs began in earnest with the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),313 which 
called on all UN agencies, including international development 
institutions, to “take measures to . . . enhance existing or, where they do 
not exist, establish mechanisms and procedures within each agency to 
draw on the expertise and views of non-governmental organizations in 
policy and programme design, implementation, and evaluation. . . .”314  
                                                          
 305.  See G.A. Res. 4(I), at 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/4(I) (Feb. 14, 1946). 
 306.  See THE UNITED NATIONS, WORKING WITH ECOSOC: AN NGOS GUIDE TO 
CONSULTATIVE STATUS 7 (2011), http://csonet.org/content/documents/Brochure.pdf (listing allowed 
activities for NGOs with consultative status). 
 307.  See The World Bank, The Bank’s Relations with NGOs: Issues and Directions, para. 13 
(World Bank Social Development Papers, Paper No. 28, 1998), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDP-28.pdf (noting the Bank’s first policy note 
on NGOs was adopted in 1981). 
 308.  WBGP 14.70, supra note 52, para. 1. 
 309.  NELSON, supra note 162, at 56. 
 310.  See Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 258 (noting that Cold War politics limited NGOs). 
 311.  See Spiro, supra note 1, at 161 (“[G]lobalization ha[s] empowered NGOs.”).   
 312.  See id. at 166–67 (arguing that including NGOs in institutional decision-making has the 
potential to limit their power because they would have to be more externally accountable and would 
have less incentive to criticize the institutions they participate in).  
 313.  See Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 265. 
 314.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF 
ACTION FROM RIO, para. 27.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.11 (1992); 
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Responding to this call, ECOSOC passed a resolution creating an 
updated framework for NGO accreditation.315  Under the new 
framework, NGOs may secure accredited status to: (1) observe and 
potentially speak at public ECOSOC meetings, (2) propose items for 
provisional agendas, and (3) submit statements.316 
This increased outreach to NGOs continued into the new millennium 
but within clear constraints.  The Secretary-General appointed a Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations in 2003 and 
gave it a broad mandate to examine the appropriate role of civil society 
in the UN.317  The Panel affirmed that greater NGO participation would 
strengthen the UN as an institution.318  It did not, however, suggest 
                                                                                                                       
see also KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 466–68 (discussing the conference and its outcomes).  
 315.  Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 266–67 (citing E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. Doc. 
E/RES/1996/31 (July 25, 1996)). 
 316.  Id. at 267 (citing E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 315, paras. 27–32).  Under the ECOSOC 
resolution, NGOs may secure varying levels of accreditation status with ECOSOC and its subsidiary 
bodies, depending on how relevant their work is to ECOSOC or the particular subsidiary body.  See 
id.  Briefly, the ECOSOC arrangements divide NGOs into three categories: category I, “General” 
status; category II, “Special” status; and category III, “Roster” status.  Id.  Category I is comprised of 
“[l]arge, multifaceted international NGOs.”  KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 232 fig. 6.3.  
Category II is comprised of “[i]nternationally known NGOs who enjoy expertise in a particular issue 
area.”  Id.  Category III is made up of “[s]maller NGOs, with occasional interests in ECOSOC 
activities.”  Id.  
  Category I NGOs have the most expansive input once they are accredited, and have the 
opportunity to “consult with officers from the [Council] Secretariat on matters of interest to the 
NGO,” proposing items for agendas, and speaking at “ECOSOC and functional commission 
meetings.”  Id.  NGOs internationally known for a particular area of expertise relevant to ECOSOC’s 
work have similar rights with respect to addressing matters within their expertise.  See id.  Smaller 
NGOs, on the other hand, have less access.  See id.  For example, their representatives cannot 
address ECOSOC meetings.  See id.  The updated framework also established that “national, 
regional, and sub-regional NGOs may seek consultative status,” which had not been the case before.  
Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 267 (citing E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 315, para. 4).  It also set a 
goal of genuine and effective engagement of NGOs from all regions of the world.  Id. (quoting 
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 315, para. 5). 
 317.  See UN-NGO Relations, UN NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE, http://www.un-
ngls.org/orf/ngorelations.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 318.  See U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global 
Governance: Rep. of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, para. 
27, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004) [hereinafter We the Peoples] stating that “enhanced 
engagement [with civil society] will make the United Nations more effective”).  Enhanced UN–
NGO engagement, the report urged, “could help the United Nations do a better job, further its global 
goals, become more attuned and responsive to citizens’ concerns and enlist greater public support.”  
Id. Executive Summary, at 8.  The Panel’s specific recommendations include permitting the 
participation of actors outside of central governments in the General Assembly’s processes, id. at 37, 
strengthened dialogue between the civil society organizations and the Security Council, id. at 46, and 
improvements in the process for accrediting civil society organizations.  Id. at 56.  Regarding the 
latter, the Report stated that the process should be depoliticized and handled by a central UN 
Accreditation Unit.  Id. paras. 127, 131.  Further, the process needs to address concerns that NGOs 
sponsored and controlled by governments are being accredited and that the process would result in a 
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changing the UN’s essential character as an exclusively 
intergovernmental organization.  The Panel stopped short of 
recommending formal NGO access to the UN General Assembly, as 
some had suggested.319  Instead, the Panel’s recommendations aimed 
broadly at reinvigorating that intergovernmental process by “[e]mbracing 
a plurality [of] constituencies,” actors, and partnerships.320 
UNDP has similar restrictions on NGO participation.  UNDP created 
an institutionalized forum for UNDP–NGO dialogue in the form of the 
UNDP CSO (Civil Society Organizations) Advisory Committee, which 
operates at the global level, and similar committees to operate at the 
country level.321  Following ECOSOC’s approach, however, UNDP 
excludes NGOs from participating in the decision-making of UNDP’s 
Executive Board.322 
After the World Bank established the World Bank Inspection Panel 
in 1993, it formalized a more active approach to NGO involvement in the 
Bank’s affairs.  It created formal bodies responsible for initiating and 
maintaining dialogue with NGOs at the central, regional, and country 
level to allow for systemic engagement.323  In principle, the Bank now 
                                                                                                                       
North–South representation imbalance.  Id. paras. 127, 161–63.  To alleviate this concern, the Report 
urged the UN to provide financial support for civil society in the poorer developing countries.  Id. 
para. 165.  Finally, the Report stated that the UN should urge member governments to allow civil 
society to flourish at the national level.  Id. para. 175.  “Effective engagement with civil society  . . . 
is no longer an option—it is a necessity . . . .”  Id. para. 38.   
 319.  The Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Status with the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (CONGO), for example, has lobbied for NGOs to have 
formal access to the General Assembly and for standardized procedures for NGO access to UN 
conferences.  KARNS & MINGST, supra note 48, at 231.  NGOs have not, however, “been united in 
[the] push to expand participation.”  Id. at 233.  Some major international NGOs view themselves as 
a privileged elite and “worry about their influence being diluted by an influx of thousands of new 
grassroots NGOs.”  Id.   
  In some limited cases, however, NGO engagement expands into the activities of the 
Security Council.  See id.  Following various consultations between NGOs and the Council on 
specific issues, the Council formed an NGO Working Group on the Security Council, with which the 
Security Council president meets periodically, privately, and off the record.  Id. at 233.   
 320.  We the Peoples, supra note 318, Executive Summary, at 9. 
 321.  UNDP Engagement with Civil Society, supra note 172; see also UNDP ENGAGEMENT 
NOTE, supra note 172, paras. 18–19 (lauding the establishment of the Advisory Committee and 
noting the need for analogues at different levels).  In addition to relying on NGOs to carry forward 
its policy goals through advocacy campaigns, UNDP contracts directly with NGOs to execute 
UNDP-funded programs.  Id. paras. 37, 39. 
 322.  See Members of the Executive Board, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www. 
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive_board/membership (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) 
(showing that all members of the Executive Board are representatives of nations). 
 323.  See WBGP 14.70, supra note 52, para. 12 (noting the “NGO-World Bank Committee meets 
regularly on both a global and regional basis to discuss issues of mutual concern” and that country 
offices also systematically interact with NGOs).  At the country level, many Bank Country Offices 
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gives credence to a role for NGOs in both its inputs and outputs.  For 
example, around 600 NGOs attended the Bank’s 2011 annual 
meetings,324 including well-known organizations like World Vision, 
Oxfam, Actionaid, and Transparency International, along with numerous 
medium-sized and smaller local groups.325  Further, a diverse cross 
section of NGOs participated in recent Bank consultative meetings on the 
role of NGOs at the Bank, among them TrustAfrica (Senegal), 
Partnership for Transparency Fund (India), and the Centre for 
Democratic Development (Ghana).326 
Outwardly, the Bank extols the benefits NGOs bring to the 
intelligence function, noting that NGO strengths commonly include 
“social proximity (grassroots and community links); . . . field-based 
development expertise; [and] important specialized knowledge or 
skills.”327  The Bank also acknowledges the importance of NGOs’ 
advocacy role in offering grassroots insights and in challenging 
conventional development thinking.328  Further, the Bank encourages 
NGOs to exercise a prescriptive role.  When formulating policies, 
strategies, and procedures, and when writing major reports, Bank staff 
seek input from expert NGOs.329  NGOs also monitor and evaluate Bank 
projects and are “particularly effective in monitoring project impacts on 
indigenous people and the environment.”330  Additionally, NGOs may be 
engaged in implementing projects331 and a number of Bank grant 
programs include NGOs as eligible recipients.332 
                                                                                                                       
have a dedicated NGO Specialist or Liaison Officer who “establishes and maintains effective 
relations among the Bank, the borrower, and NGOs at the country level.”  Id. para. 30.  At the 
regional and network levels, the “NGO–Civil Society Unit of the Social Development Family 
develops and coordinates the Bank’s overall relationship with NGOs.”  Id. para. 31.  This unit 
“promotes within the Bank practices and procedures that facilitate collaboration with NGOs” and 
“monitors NGO involvement in Bank-financed activities.”  Id. 
 324.  Civil Society: Mainstreaming CSO Participation in the Annual Meetings, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/XO68BPDNP0 (last updated Oct. 27, 2011). 
 325.  See The World Bank, List of CSO Representatives Present at the 2011 Annual Meetings, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/2011AMs-ARRIVED-CSOs-List-FINAL.pdf. 
 326.  See, e.g., The World Bank, List of Participants: Roundtable–Supporting the Accountability 
Agenda: The Enhanced Role of CSOs, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/cons_april 
27_participant.pdf. 
 327.  WBGP 14.70, supra note 52, para. 6(a)–(c). 
 328.  Id. para. 7. 
 329.  Id. para. 11. 
 330.  Id. para. 22. 
 331.  Id. para. 13. 
 332.  Id. para. 23.  For a full account of World Bank grant programs, see Smyth, supra note 171. 
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But the Bank does not reinforce its repeated acknowledgement of 
NGOs’ potential contributions with a strong commitment to engaging 
with NGOs.333  The Bank encourages its staff to consult with NGOs at 
various levels of its work.334  It also gently encourages its borrowers to 
involve NGOs.335  In neither case, however, does it back its exhortations 
with incentives.  For example, although the Bank acknowledges NGOs’ 
expertise on indigenous peoples,336 it does not include NGO 
representatives of indigenous peoples—whose livelihoods will be 
directly affected—in formulating conditions of Bank loans intended to 
protect indigenous people.337 
Accordingly, the Bank’s external political climate, rather than its 
institutional commitment, is its incentive to seek NGO inputs.  In some 
instances, this external pressure may suffice.  After all, the Bank’s 
external operating environment is characterized by a history of 
vociferous protests by anti-globalization protesters and others against 
certain Bank actions.338  But, merely exhorting consultation stops far 
short of affording NGOs a meaningful role in the institution, or a voice 
before the Board of Executive Directors, the seat of the Bank’s power. 
b. Critique of the Exclusion Norm 
The UN, acting through UNDP, and the World Bank say that NGO 
participation is essential to their institutional credibility.  Both 
institutions frame that assertion as a belief that NGO participation 
contributes to their institutional effectiveness.  At odds with this position, 
however, is their lack of substantive action to ensure that NGO input will 
be secured and heard.  The World Bank and UNDP’s decision-making 
                                                          
 333.  See WBGP 14.70, supra note 52, para. 1 (encouraging but not mandating collaboration 
with NGOs).   
 334.  See id. (stating that the Bank “encourages borrowers and staff members to consult with 
NGOs and to involve them, as appropriate, in Bank-supported activities, including economic and 
sector work and all stages of project processing—identification, design, implementation, and 
monitoring and evaluation”). 
 335.  See id. para. 17. 
 336.  See id. para. 22. 
 337.  See Woods, Intergovernmental Institutions, supra note 129, at 70 (noting that “there are 
increasing calls for particular groups within countries whose livelihoods are affected by the [Bank] 
to be included directly in the formulation and implementation of conditionality”). 
 338.  See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 3; Anup Shah, IMF & World Bank Protests, 
Washington, D.C., GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/article/23/imf--world-bank-
protests-washington-dc (last updated July 13, 2001) (describing protests against the Bank in April 
2000). 
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bodies remain the preserve of a constricted, state-only club.  Further, 
absent the imposition of mandatory requirements on Bank staff to obtain 
and reflect NGO input in the proposals they present to the Board, the 
information and inputs on which that club bases its decision will likely 
continue to be constricted also. 
Neither inclusion nor exclusion need be absolute.  A closer look at 
the kinds of decisions the Board makes shows why a more nuanced 
approach would make sense.  Recall that the founders of the Bank were 
concerned not to give the institution a blank check to lend.339  That is 
why the founders detailed specific conservative financial policies in the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement.  The founders of such institutions, 
therefore, would need to consider the specific aspects of institutional 
decision-making with which NGO input would be helpful.  For example, 
the Bank depends on bonds it sells on capital markets for its operating 
capital.340  The viability of that financing model, therefore, cannot be 
jeopardized.  The expertise and experience of development-focused 
NGOs is not relevant to the Bank’s decisions about what bond markets to 
tap and what rate of interest to pay.  On the other hand, the input of 
NGOs may be highly relevant, possibly invaluable, to decisions about 
how to design a loan to defray the costs of adjusting a country’s tax base 
or installing a new sewer system.  To properly calibrate where NGO 
participation could make a contribution, however, the norm of exclusion 
would first have to shift. 
Despite the newer institutions’ embrace of NGO participation in 
governance, it would be a mistake to assume that we are on a forward 
march towards an inclusion norm.  True, given the strength of NGOs in 
the Western Hemisphere, it is difficult to imagine that an international 
development institution created by Western powers today would 
completely exclude NGOs from participation.  Western powers, 
however, are not the only donors to international development 
institutions.  Indeed, their influence is poised to decline as emerging 
powers become increasingly engaged in international development 
assistance.341  For example, changing power dynamics in the World 
Bank—which give a stronger voice to emerging economies342 that have 
                                                          
 339.  See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
 340.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 341.  See Ngaire Woods, Whose Aid?  Whose Influence?  China, Emerging Donors and the 
Silent Revolution in Development Assistance, 84 INT’L AFF. 1205, 1205–06 (2008) (noting the 
existence of emerging donors and their challenge to the current development regime). 
 342.  See Leslie Wroughton, China Gains Clout in World Bank Vote Shift, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 
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traditionally been hostile to NGOs (notably China)343—make it possible 
that the exclusionist view will emerge with new vigor.  Notably, in the 
single example of a special purpose fund where developing countries 
have a controlling voice over Western democracies, namely the 
Adaptation Fund, the degree of NGO participation in governance is 
nugatory.344 
Additionally, a significant segment of other nonstate actors, the for-
profit arm of the private sector (courted by both established institutions 
and special purpose funds),345 tend to disfavor NGO participation.346  
                                                                                                                       
2010), http://reuters.com/article/2010/04/25/us-worldbank-idUSTRE63O1RQ20100425 (noting the 
increase to 4.42% from 2.77% in China’s share of voting power as part of a shift at the World Bank 
to give emerging economies more influence).   
 343.  See Deyong Yin, China’s Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 521, 529–30 (2009) (noting that NGOs concerned with politically sensitive issues risk “abrupt 
closure” in China but also that Chinese officials have become less negative towards foreign NGOs). 
 344.  See The Adaptation Fund NGO Network—How it Works . . ., ADAPTATION FUND NGO 
NETWORK, http://germanwatch.org/klima/afn1.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (detailing actions 
NGOs can take related to the Adaptation Fund’s board, including observation of board meetings and 
exchanges with board members).  The Adaptation Fund is one of the funding mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.  Ralph Czarnecki & Kaveh Guilanpour, The Adaptation Fund After 
Poznán, 2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 79, 79 (2009).  It became operational in late 2008–early 
2009.  See id.  The Fund is financed from the sale of certified emission reductions (CER) credits.  
About the Adaptation Fund, ADAPTATION FUND, http://www.adaptation-fund.org/about (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012).  CER credits are issued for “emission-reduction projects in developing countries.”  Id.  
Developed countries can sell CER credits to help them reach their targets for emission reduction 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  Id.  The Adaptation Fund is controlled by the Adaptation Fund Board 
(AFB).  Id.  The design of the AFB purposefully gives developing country representatives majority 
control.  See Adaptation Fund Board, ADAPTATION FUND, http://www.adaptation-
fund.org/about/the-board (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (noting 69% of AFB members are 
representatives of developing countries).  Of the sixteen-member board, ten positions are selected 
from the five UN regional groupings, two per group.  Id.  In all of these regions, except for the 
Western European and Others region, developing countries dominate the membership.  See United 
Nations Regional Groups of Member States, DEP’T GEN. ASSEMBLY & CONF. MGMT., 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml (last updated Sept. 10, 2012).  In addition, 
of the remaining six board seats, four positions are guaranteed to non-Annex I countries of the 
UNFCCC (all of which are developing countries), see List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_ 
observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2012), by reserving one seat for a 
small island developing country, one for a representative of the least developed countries, and two 
more for other non-Annex I countries.  Adaptation Fund Board, supra.  AFB voting is strictly one 
vote per board member—there is no weighted voting system.  THE ADAPTATION FUND, RULES OF 
PROCEDURE OF THE ADAPTATION FUND BOARD para. 45.  NGOs can participate in the AFB 
meetings as informal observers and informal consultants, but they have no formal space in the fund’s 
design.  See id. paras. 31–34.   
 345.  See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 37, at 1000 (noting that the Global Fund’s creators thought 
“contributions and participation of the private sector . . . to be of vital importance to the Fund’s 
success” (citing FIRST MEETING OF THE TRANSITIONAL WORKING GROUP TO ESTABLISH A GLOBAL 
FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 5 (2001), available at http://theglobalfund. 
org/documents/board/twg/Board_1STTWG_Report_en/)). 
 346.  See Crocker Snow, Jr., NGO Overreach: Greenpeace Pours Oil on Troubled Waters but 
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This tendency is apparent in a family of special purpose funds that 
“purchase project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions in 
developing countries,” called the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit.347  
The Carbon Funds in the Carbon Finance Unit are comprised of for-
profit and government donors and provide no space for NGOs in their 
governance structures.348  The exclusionist norm, therefore, is far from 
dead. 
C. NGOs’ Contribution to Credibility 
What, then, does the contrast between the role of NGOs in the 
special purpose funds and the established institutions indicate for the 
importance of NGO participation in governance to the credibility of 
international development institutions?  Fundamentally, the contrast is a 
testament to a major change in the power dynamics of international 
development assistance since the end of the Cold War.  The special 
purpose funds’ growth in popularity epitomizes the growth of NGO 
power and influence.  Throughout the Cold War, and before it, 
international development assistance was largely a government-to-
government affair.349  The primary concern of the world powers that 
control international development institutions like the World Bank was 
to have those institutions do whatever was necessary and within their 
power to preserve Cold War allegiances.350  Supporting those 
allegiances, not achieving development, was the primary goal of 
international development assistance.351  Little attention was paid to what 
inputs these institutions should rely on in deciding what activities to 
fund.352  Indeed, these institutions acted unquestioningly as government-
only clubs. 
                                                                                                                       
Can’t Clean it Up, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 1997, at 161, 162 (discussing how 
NGOs can attack corporations and “revel in raising questions about [corporations’] accountability”).  
But see Spiro, supra note 194, at 968 (noting corporations may welcome NGO participation because 
NGOs would then be forced to become more accountable). 
 347.  About World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (CFU), CARBON FIN. UNIT, WORLD BANK, 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=About&ItemID=24668 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 348.  See Carbon Finance at the World Bank: List of Funds, CARBON FIN. UNIT, WORLD BANK, 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Funds&ItemID=24670 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 349.  See Smyth, supra note 171, at 498. 
 350.  See WOODS, supra note 60, at 33 (noting that the World Bank’s “work became inextricably 
linked to the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War”).  
 351.  See, e.g., id. at 33–34 (discussing Bank patterns of support and noting that “U.S. 
administrators were required by law to ensure that any assistance to which they contributed met U.S. 
geopolitical needs”). 
 352.  See id. at 39 (stating that history, economic theory, and their organizational charters did not 
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That status quo has changed.  The transboundary expansion of cause 
NGOs has been unleashed, and their concerns have now replaced donor 
countries’ Cold War preoccupations as the driving force in setting 
international development aid agendas.353  Countries’ foreign affairs 
agendas still influence development assistance, but the rise in NGO 
power coupled with the emergence of global problems has changed both 
the key priorities and the key actors involved.  The growth of the special 
purpose funds, and the role NGOs play in them, is the result of these 
changes.  The funds’ structures indicate that the driving forces behind 
international development assistance have changed.  NGOs dominate the 
agenda.  That change begs the question of who should be involved in a 
development institution’s decision-making.  The incremental, but 
persistent and ongoing, increase in NGO participation in the special 
purpose funds shows that the case for NGO participation is irrefutable in 
the face of political realities. 
This dynamic is evident in NGOs’ expanding role in GEF 
governance, in their role as coequal decision-makers in the Global Fund, 
and in the starting assumptions in the framing of the Green Climate 
Fund.354  At no point, for example, was the exclusion of NGOs from fund 
governance contemplated for the Green Climate Fund.  The only 
question put before the Working Group responsible for the Green 
Climate Fund’s design was which of the two competing models, active 
observer or coequal decision-maker, the Green Climate Fund would 
adopt.355  The interesting question is whether those realities will also 
force greater NGO participation in the older institutions.  Donor states 
may continue to create and finance multiple new institutions for multiple 
new needs.  Alternatively, donors may reconfigure the World Bank and 
the UN so they serve the central role in international development they 
were originally created to serve.  Recapturing these institutions’ 
credibility will take more than providing for NGO participation in 
governance.356  In our multi-stakeholder international order, however, 
opening a role for NGOs in governance would be one necessary step. 
                                                                                                                       
help define to whom the World Bank and IMF should lend or under what conditions). 
 353.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 354.  See supra Part III.B. 
 355.  See Press Release, Framework Convention on Climate Change-Secretariat, Design Process 
of UNFCCC Green Climate Fund Fully on Track, Says UNFCCC Executive Secretary (Sept. 13, 
2011) (noting the Fund’s creators participated in a workshop on, inter alia, how to engage civil 
society in the Fund). 
 356.  See generally Pincus & Winters, supra note 19 (discussing the numerous criticisms of the 
World Bank and proposed solutions). 
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In the absence of empirical research, we do not know whether NGO 
participation in governance actually improves a development 
institution’s effectiveness.  Functionally, however, the special purpose 
funds clearly have some lessons to impart.  They illustrate the minimum 
conditions necessary to maximize the likelihood that NGO participation 
in governance will have a positive impact on institutional credibility.  
Three guideposts stand out in particular. 
First, the special purpose funds show that to be meaningful, NGO 
participation must occur at an institution’s locus of power.  NGOs must 
have access to the body that both sets policy and decides what projects 
and activities the institution will finance among competing proposals.  
Further, as the GEF experience shows, there should be flexibility in 
when and where NGO participation is allowed.  This flexibility allows 
for the possibility that the power center of an initiative may change over 
time—as happened, for example, in the infiltration of significant policy 
discussions into GEF replenishment meetings.357 
Second, the special purpose funds show that the decision to create a 
space for NGOs is just a first step.  It must be accompanied by further 
decisions on processes and mechanisms.  These must address procedures 
for selecting the NGOs that will participate and for continually 
monitoring the accountability of NGOs after they are selected.  These 
processes keep potential conflicts of interest in check.  Further, processes 
are necessary to guard against NGOs’ inputs being tainted by their 
interest in obtaining an implementing role in a given project or proposal. 
Both the GEF and the Global Fund provide clear indicators of what 
those processes and mechanisms should contain.  The GEF’s amendment 
of its processes on this issue, for example, shows that the NGO 
community itself is best suited to select and monitor the NGO 
representatives.  Fund donors, however, play a key role upfront in setting 
the parameters for selection, particularly by mandating diversity and a 
reasonable balance of international and local NGO representatives. 
Third, the special purpose funds show that for NGO participation to 
have meaningful potential to enhance credibility, NGOs’ access to 
formal meetings as observers must be supplemented by opportunities for 
pre-meeting meetings, along with some level of continual engagement at 
the country or regional level.  The intra-meeting connections forged by 
the GEF-NGO Network, for example, have been a key part of the NGOs’ 
                                                          
 357.  See Smyth, supra note 119, at 86–87. 
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participation in the GEF.358  The NGO universe is vast and inchoate, 
making some level of mandated continual engagement critical to NGO 
participation being truly representative. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
NGO participation in the governance of international development 
institutions is not critical to those institutions’ legitimacy unless member 
governments expressly mandate such participation.  International 
development institutions will be legitimate regardless of whether they 
include NGOs in governance as long as they comply with the 
predetermined mandates of the states that create them.  Recent evidence 
suggests, however, that NGO participation in governance may be critical 
to an international development institution’s credibility.  NGOs have 
become key drivers and mobilizers of public support for international 
development assistance, and experience shows that their support is 
contingent on their having a role in governance. 
NGOs’ expanded role as a driving force behind international 
development has led to donor states setting up a host of special purpose 
funds, which serve as alternatives to the World Bank and the UN.  This 
phenomenon shows that the older institutions have lost ground as the 
fulcrum of international development assistance.  This result suggests 
that the older institutions’ continued exclusion of NGOs from 
governance may come at an unsustainable cost to their institutional 
credibility and their relevance to the development challenges of the 
future.  If member states want the Bank and UNDP to be at the center of 
the action, they will need to reconsider their exclusion of NGOs from 
those institutions’ governance.  They will need to realign their rhetoric 
acknowledging NGOs’ unique expertise with their practices by allowing 
that expertise to be heard and absorbed at the level of institutional 
governance.  The future face of international development assistance 
hangs in the balance. 
                                                          
 358.  See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
